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Abstract:
Intel Corporation is looking to strengthen its long-term competitive armor by engaging in
new initiatives to develop world-class customer service and build strong customer
loyalty. A company's supply chain design and processes often hold the key to how well
the company can serve its customers. This thesis looks to unlock new approaches for
Intel to improve the customer responsiveness of its microprocessor supply chain. The
primary approaches examined include (1) the identification and implementation of
customer-focused supply chain metrics through a metrics framework and (2) the
application of traditional inventory models and service level to determine optimal
microprocessor inventory levels for Intel's die and finished goods inventories. The base
stock inventory model is used along with extensions to the model based on work by
Graban (1999) and Levesques (2004) that include two-stage inventory analysis along
with supply variability inputs. The results of the inventory models are then compared
with Intel's current inventory strategy based on heuristics. Next the application of the
inventory models are extended to examine the possibility of setting service levels by
product segment and the resulting impact on overall inventory mix and inventory levels.
Finally, other approaches for improving the customer responsiveness of Intel's
microprocessor supply chain are discussed at a high level as potential areas for future
research. Many of the frameworks, learnings, and insights from the research done at Intel
are transferable to other corporations which seek to make similar improvements to the
customer responsiveness of their supply chains.
Thesis Supervisor: Donald Rosenfield
Title: Senior Lecturer, Sloan School of Management
Thesis Supervisor: David Simchi-Levi
Title: Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering & Engineering Systems
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Chapter 1. Introduction and Thesis Overview
"The ability of the supply chain to support exceptional customer service
is a differentiator and one of the business battlegrounds for the foreseeable future."'
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Chapter 1. Introduction and Thesis Overview
"The customer is always king."
Or so they say. For Intel, the world's largest and most successful semiconductor
company, the customer has not always been king. Technology innovation and
manufacturing are viewed as king internally as the company's primary core
competencies. However, as the high-tech landscape continues to evolve at a rapid pace
and as Intel moves more aggressively into new business areas, Intel realizes that its
technology and manufacturing advantages may not last forever. Intel recognizes the
importance of serving its customers better to build customer loyalty and strengthen its
long-term competitiveness. A critical part of becoming more customer-focused is
designing and managing a supply chain that is highly responsive to customer needs.
This thesis will analyze the customer-impacting aspects of Intel's microprocessor supply
chain and will provide detailed frameworks, analysis, and recommendations on how Intel
can increase its responsiveness to customers through the supply chain. The main
approaches will focus on (1) company-wide implementation of customer-focused supply
chain metrics and (2) optimization of inventory levels and inventory placement by
applying traditional inventory models and the concept of "service level." The thesis will
also provide preliminary exploration of other potential strategies to improve customer
responsiveness based on current understanding of Intel's processes and systems. These
approaches provide potential areas for future research to continue improvement of supply
chain responsiveness to customers. Many of the frameworks, leamings, and insights from
the research done at Intel are transferable to other corporations which seek to make
similar improvements to the customer responsiveness of their supply chains.
Customer Service and the Supply Chain
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What do customer service and supply chain have to do with one another? As Kevin
O'Brien and Mike Schickedanz, supply chain management consultants for MidWest
Group explain, "How you design and manage your supply chain can significantly affect
your ability to provide the levels of service your customers demand.""
A company's supply chain design from its customer order processes to its manufacturing
and inventory systems to its logistics operations to its supply chain metrics all impact
how well a company can service its customers.
By examining a company's supply chain operations and making improvements to it, a
company can transform its ability to serve its customers. Companies like Gillette serve as
real-world case studies as to how changes in a company's supply chain operations can
drive dramatic improvements in its ability to service its customers (Duffy, 2004). This
was the exact philosophy behind the research conducted at Intel Corporation in the
Microprocessor Marketing and Business Planning (MMBP) group from June 2003 to
January 2004 in Santa Clara, CA as part of the LFM internship.
Customer Service and Customer Responsiveness
"Customer service" appears to be one of the most ambiguous terms used in business. Its
meaning often depends on the context in which it is used. The most common dimensions
of "customer service" as it relates to supply chain are summarized in the table below.
Dimension of Description Example
Customer Service
Promptness How quickly were we able to respond 24 hour response to a product request
back to the customer's request with an
answer?
Availability Did we have exactly what the customer Confirming to the customer that we
wanted when they wanted it? can meet their requested delivery
date and requested quantities
Quality Did the quality of our product or service All products shipped to the customer
meet the expectations of the customer? were defect-free and excellent quality
Execution How well did we execute and meet our We met the delivery date we
promises to the customer? promised to our customer for this
order.
12
Consistency Does the level of service we provide We are able to meet a customer's
customers vary greatly or is it usually weekly requests exactly as requested
consistent? 95% of the time with 2% standard
deviation.
Flexibility How well are we able to support customer We are able to immediately support a
requests that are exceptions out of the sudden 20% upswing in demand
normal expected service? from a customer with no additional
investment.
When one speaks of a company being "customer responsive," these supply chain-related
dimensions of customer service come to mind primarily:
1. Promptness: Responding quickly to questions or requests. (Example: "They were
very responsive in answering my question.")
2. Availability: Satisfying requests for product exactly in the timing and quantity
needed. (Example: "They were very responsive in meeting my needs for 100 units
to be delivered by Tuesday.")
3. Execution: Acting to get products quickly to customers. (Example: "They were
responsive in getting products shipped to us very quickly.")
A simple customer service framework (the "Customer Responsiveness Framework") was
developed for Intel to effectively communicate these three dimensions of customer
service which are crucial to Intel's microprocessor business from a supply chain
standpoint. (Figure 1-1)
This framework breaks down a typical customer order into the three customer
responsiveness elements discussed (Promptness, Availability, Execution) and will act as
the common mental model for the rest of the research discussed in this thesis:
- The supply chain metrics approach to improving customer responsiveness looks at
all of these three elements and ensures that proper customer-focused metrics are
in place to measure and provide visibility for these three areas.
- The inventory modeling approach primarily addresses the Availability dimension
and provides models and analysis to recommend optimal inventory levels that
balance desired service level to customers and inventory cost.
- Other approaches to increase customer responsiveness discussed in this thesis also
touch all the 3 areas of the mental model.
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Figure 1-1. Customer Responsiveness Framework developed tor Intel
Summary of Thesis Research Areas Promptness Availability Execution
Implementation of New Customer-focused X X X
Metrics (Chapter 4)
Application of Quantitative Inventory Models X
(Chapters 6-7)
Other Approaches for Improving Customer X X X
Responsiveness (Chapter 8)
Thesis Overview
This thesis is divided into ten chapters. This chapter (chapter 1) provides a brief
background and introduction to the research discussed in this thesis. Chapters 2-3
examine Intel's microprocessor business today as well as provide an overview of Intel's
supply chain and manufacturing processes. These processes provide the background and
foundation for much of research discussed in this thesis. Chapter 4 discusses the
implementation of relevant customer-focused supply chain metrics, one of which will
support Intel's desired direction towards using quantitative inventory models and service
levels to achieve optimal inventory levels and inventory mix discussed in Chapters 5-7.
Chapter 8 explores other potential ways that Intel can look into improving the customer
14
Customer Responsivenes Dm n
responsiveness of its supply chain. Chapter 9 examines some of the key considerations in
implementing the two main approaches discussed in this thesis from strategic, political,
and cultural perspectives. Chapter 10 provides final thoughts and recommendations.
15
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Chapter 2. Intel's Microprocessor Business
"For the foreseeable future, our core business of microprocessors and chipsets for PCs
and servers will produce the majority of our revenues.""'
17
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I
Chapter 2. Intel's Microprocessor Business
Incorporated in 1968, Intel Corporation is the world's largest semiconductor chip maker
supplying advanced technology solutions for the computing and communications
industries. The company's major products include microprocessors; chipsets; boards;
flash memory; application processors used in cellular handsets and hand-held computing
devices; cellular baseband chipsets; networking and communications products, such as
ethernet connectivity products, optical components and network processing components,
and embedded control chips (microcontrollers).
Intel's Main Business Divisions
Intel is split up into two main businesses: Intel Architecture (IA) and Intel
Communications Group (ICG). The IA business provides the advanced technologies to
support the desktop, mobile and enterprise platforms. IA's business includes Intel's
microprocessor business which constituted about 73% of Intel's consolidated net revenue
in 2003. The ICG business focuses on wired and wireless connectivity products and
provides key components for networking and communications infrastructure devices.
ICG's business also covers component-level products and solutions for the wireless hand-
held communications market, which were previously part of the WCCG group merged
into ICG at the end of December 2003.
This thesis will focus on the IA part of Intel's business, particularly around Intel's
microprocessor products.
Intel's Microprocessor Business
Intel's microprocessors function as the central processing units (CPUs) of computer
systems. These microprocessors process system data and control other devices in the
system, acting as the "brains" of computers. For many years Intel has been the dominant
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CPU manufacturer and is the market leader in many segments of the market. Intel has
primarily accomplished this through its strengths in microprocessor design,
manufacturing, and marketing.
Intel's microprocessor products are segmented into three main categories:
1) Desktop - desktop computers and entry-level workstations
2) Mobile - notebook computers
3) Server - high-end servers and workstations that often have multiple
microprocessors working together.
Intel's main customers in the CPU space are OEMs (Original Equipment Manufacturers),
ODMs (Original Design Manufacturers), and channel customers that include distributors,
resellers, and retailers all around the world. Figure 2-1 is a diagram of Intel's Value
Chain (Rassey, 2003) extended to include ODMs.
ODM
Figure 2-1. Intel's Value Chain
Most of the power in the value chain resides with the OEMs which make up the majority
of Intel's total revenues. However, channel customers like distributors, resellers, retailers
(generally categorized as "distributors" in the diagram) are extremely crucial in helping
Intel reach customers in developing countries like Russia and India. Another group of
customers growing in influence and size are ODMs. ODMs build and design products
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(such as PCs and other electronics devices) for OEMs which then market and sell the
products under their own brand names.
Intel's microprocessor business generally has followed seasonal demand trends. For the
past five years, the company's sales of microprocessors were higher in the second half of
the year, primarily due to back-to-school and holiday demand.
Intel Microprocessor Customer Sales Process - CCP Process
Customers (direct OEMs or channel customers) who wish to order CPUs from Intel
typically do not encounter the common first-come, first-served process that most other
high-tech companies have. Nor are they given a standard lead time like electronics
component manufacturers give to their potential customers. Instead, Intel's CPU
customers go through a sales process that is more similar to an allocation-based sales
process that other high-tech companies adopt only when supply is limited.
Instead of a first-come, first-served customer service model, Intel uses what is called a
"corporate commits process" (CCP) to address customer requests for CPUs.
The primary goals of CCP are to (1) ensure fair and adequate distribution of CPU supply
across all customers and geographies and (2) ensure that Intel does not make supply
commitments greater than the available capacity of its semiconductor fabrication plants
("fabs") since the cost of additional fab capacity is extremely costly in the billions of
dollars for each fab.
Without the CCP process, some customers may try to game available CPU supply in
situations where there is an anticipated product shortage or current shortage to ensure
supply for themselves and/or keep competitors from getting supply. For example, in a
scenario where there is a short supply of hot CPUs in high demand, Customer A might
want to buy as many as possible to ensure their own supply as well as to prevent
Customer B from getting the quantities that they need, and vice versa. The CCP process
minimizes the risks to companies from such possible gaming. CCP also keeps internal
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Intel sales groups honest. For instance, in a CPU shortage scenario, one of the four
geographies might ask for as many CPUs as possible to maximize its own sales
regardless of whether this may hurt sales in other regions. Finally the CCP process keeps
Intel from promising more product that it can provide based on its anticipated fab
capacity.
Figure 2-2 provides a simplified high-level map of the CCP process:
Customer Inte Galsr Each Ge6 MRjde
S iCPCAga submits C -itssrcev demand from- MMBP cmmits
byit resqurestaed eachr amourn a q 6 back
Figure 2-2. Intel Corporate Commits Process (CCP)
With CCP, at the beginning of every quarter customers submit to Intel what quantity of
CPUs they expect to buy in the next quarter. Then each of Intel's 4 Geos (geographies:
ASMO, APAC, IKK, EMEA) rolls up the quantities from each customer and reports this
to MMBP (Microprocessor Marketing and Business Planning). MMBP then 'judges" the
demand based on Intel's current strategy, future price moves, supply, and capacity and
communicates a committed quantity back to each Geo. The GBA (geo business analyst)
at each Geo divides its geographic committed units across the customers in that Geo and
alerts all the Intel CBAs (customer business analysts). The CBAs then give the commits
to customers and customers have 2.5 weeks to place orders or "book" orders up to their
committed amount. Customers place their orders through WOM, Intel's Internet-based
web order management website, or through their CBAs. After the order booking deadline
for customer commits, Intel "pulls back" any remaining committed units that were not
booked and puts those units back into the general inventory pool. Customers are not
required to book all the units that were committed to them and there is no penalty for
unbooked units.
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Although the CCP process is disliked by some of Intel's customers because of the extra
steps and because customers cannot order the amounts they want anytime they want,
overall the CCP process has worked well to ensure a fair and equitable supply across all
customers and geographies. It also has given customers assurance that they will not be
shut out of supply in times of product shortages. However, CCP introduces slower
customer response and more complexity than traditional first-come, first-served customer
sales processes such as available-to-promise (ATP). The CCP process also requires
significant human intervention across a number of groups every quarter to confirm
product availability and determine how much of a customer's requested quantity can be
supported. In many companies with Internet-based order interfaces that connect with
internal ATP inventory systems, customers can get automated and immediate product
request grants and order confirmations. There might be better approaches than CCP that
may achieve the same goals but increase responsiveness and flexibility for Intel's
customers. This is not within the scope of this research but may be a valuable topic for
future research.
Intel Microprocessor Customer Sales Process - Hotlist Process
For changes to existing booked orders ("bookings") or additional requests for product 0-
13 weeks in advance, customers go through Intel's "hotlist" process. The hotlist process
allows customers to submit changes to what they had ordered already for the next 0-13
weeks and get an answer back from Intel. Today hotlist response time (from the point a
customer submits a hotlist request to the time the customer gets a response) ranges
anywhere from 1 day to I week.
There are 4 common types of hotlists:
Hotlist Request Description
Type
Upside A customer request for additional units of product in a given
workweek (WW). This is the most common type of hotlist request.
Swap A customer request to cancel already booked units in exchange for
additional units of another related product.
Pull-in A customer request to receive product booked for a future date to be
delivered in a WW earlier in a quarter.
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Push-out A customer request to push out in time the delivery of product that
has been committed and booked.
Figure 2-3 provides a simplified high-level map of the hotlist process:
Figureer-3.fpossil, G poe
sbmit hoteist of desired GBAs fulfill s os t the
CBe rs at Itel CB thnsumtqhserq estst te GBsa hiep crtiGe.l h
requests f cir 0- ach requests fromu requests from ts b13 weeks ( supply pi."bucketi daily process
MMBP cormit Eat eo Customer rapt Cu$fn$s
e qty for hotist dividnie fr tel customerm ui fo or ctu i
graets back toa gres u f ow much they t h kle
resluton y M BP.Outof he otlst equ stso grane duigthr e leng thek
P an each Ge o maer can have hotlie drivpt
Figure 2-3. Intel hotlist process.
Within 13 weeks of desired product delivery, customers submit hotlist requests to the
CBAs at Intel. CBAs then submit these requests to the GBAs at their respective Geo. The
GBAs first check their sustaining buckets (units of active SKUs with excess inventory
that have been commit th ere no bod fulfill any hotlist requests from these buckets
and let their CBAs know. Next the GBAs escalat e cmoremaining unfulfilled hotlists to
PSPs (product supply planners) in Division. If there is sufficient inventory, the PSPs give
the GBA a hotlist grant in the form of committed units for that Geo. For critical hotlist
requests which are still unfulfilled, they are escalated to the weekly Soance meeting for
resolution by MMBP. Out of the hotlist requests granted during the Seance meeting, the
PSPs grant each Geo a number of committed units that the Geo can then divide up across
its customers. Customers find out the number of units thav uetve been committed to
them from their CBAs and have week to book the orders (2 weeks for channel
customers). After the hotlist booking deadline, Intel "pulls back" any remaining
committed hotlist units that were not booked to support future hotlists. Customers are not
required to book all (or any of) the units that were committed to them through hotlist
requests and there is no penalty for unbooked units.
The hotlist process is valuable to Intel and its customers in that it allows customers to
submit "last-minute" requests to respond to unexpected market changes or forecast error.
However with the current process, customers, who often have urgent requests and would
like prompt responses, have to wait anywhere from I day to I week for Intel's response
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to their hotlist requests. Like the CCP process, the hotlist process today requires
significant human intervention and cannot provide customers with quick immediate
response. Other companies with Internet-based order interfaces that connect with internal
ATP inventory systems can provide customers with automated and immediate responses
even for change requests. This is also an area that possibly can be re-engineered to
require less human involvement and quicker customer response. One current pathfinding
initiative to address these issues specifically is the WICIT project. WICIT is attempting
to build tools and automation to empower Geos with more real-time information to
reduce the need to escalate requests to Division and MMBP so Geos can provide rapid
response to customer hotlist requests.
One challenge with the hotlist process today is that it does not provide incentives to deter
gaming by customers. Customers can submit hotlist requests, be granted additional units,
and end up booking no additional units without penalty. This gives customers no cost
safety blankets a week at a time (and channel customers two weeks) since unbooked units
are pulled back after a week for direct OEM customers and after two weeks for channel
customers. This potentially hurts other customers who may have real needs and are
intending to book orders for units granted to them via hotlists.
Another common way of gaming supply using hotlists is to request and book up as many
hotlist units as possible with no specific intention of using these units. Because of Intel's
apparent generous and no-penalty cancellation terms with large customers, often large
customers will book up a number of extra units granted from the hotlist process and then
cancel these units at the end of every quarter without penalty. To customers, this provides
a valuable and no-cost insurance policy for CPU supply every quarter. However, this
potentially takes units away from other customers who have real demand for these units
and reduces revenues for Intel.
Customers also game supply and potentially cause problems in quarterly production
schedules in the following way: to hedge demand uncertainty, customers might submit
hotlist requests and book up much more than needed in the first weeks of a quarter. Then
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as weeks pass in the quarter, customers do not end up needing the units and then request
"push-outs" to push these units to later in the quarter. Since these units have already been
built and committed for these customers, customers are guaranteed supply availability
later in the quarter (as compared to booking up more than needed at the end of quarter
and not having pull-in requests fulfilled). And once the end of quarter approaches,
customers can cancel the orders with little or no penalty. This is another way customers
can game the system and get an insurance policy on supply.
One final way customers are noticeably gaming supply through hotlist requests is by
requesting additional upsides without canceling other existing orders until the end of the
quarter in swap situations. Especially in cases where Intel's customers are not certain
which of several products will resonate best with their customers, Intel's customers will
try to hedge their bets using upside requests. Customers might already have orders
booked for one product and then request upsides for another related product. In reality
they will sell only one of these products and should be submitting a swap (cancellation of
I product and an upside of another) instead of an upside request. However, because it is
difficult for Intel to discover the real intentions of customers, this is another common way
customers game Intel's CPU supply.
The hotlist process is another area of potential research for Intel. Perhaps there are more
effective approaches of providing a hotlist-type process that discourage and prevent the
gaming that has been discussed above. By reducing this gaming, supply availability may
improve for customers and also improve responsiveness. However, this is not in the
scope of the current research. This will be discussed further in chapter 8 as one of the
other potential approaches to improve customer responsiveness for Intel.
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Chapter 3. Intel's Microprocessor Supply Chain and Manufacturing Overview
"Imagine if you had to build 100 million units a year of something that takes hundreds of
complex steps to make, requires plants and equipment that cost billions, has a very short
life-cycle, and faces ever-increasing customer expectations for more functionality while
prices continue to drop... that's Intel."iv
27
This page intentionally left blank.
28
Chapter 3. Intel's Microprocessor Supply Chain and Manufacturing Process Overview
This chapter discusses Intel's microprocessor supply chain and high-level microprocessor
manufacturing processes. This overview will provide a valuable foundation for the
discussion of metrics and application of inventory models at Intel in subsequent chapters.
Current Supply Chain Organizational Model
At Intel, supply chain functions are decentralized across the company. There does not
appear to be any central organization at Intel that defines corporate-wide supply chain
strategy and coordinates supply chain activity across organizations. Responsibilities for
Intel's supply chain functions are dispersed across multiple organizations including
MMBP, Planning, ISNG, EBG, WCST, and SMG.
MMBP
Microprocessor Marketing and Business Planning (MMBP) is the organization which
manages the demand forecasting and supply responsibility for Intel's microprocessor and
chipset businesses. MMBP is responsible for determining the global demand forecasts for
all of Intel's microprocessor products from the marketing and sales perspective. MMBP's
demand forecast (internally referred to as Judged Demand) is the demand forecast that is
used as the primary input to drive short-term (0-12 month) production planning. From a
supply standpoint, MMBP monitors ongoing product supply and customer demand and
addresses supply issues when demand exceeds supply. MMBP also takes major
responsibility in planning for product transitions from EOL products to new products. In
addition to supply and demand, MMBP's responsibilities include product pricing and
long-range business planning.
Interestingly enough, MMBP reports to the Desktop Platforms Group (DPG) within
Intel's organization, although its demand and supply responsibilities tend to cover
products in other divisions beyond DPG, including the Mobile Platforms Group (MPG),
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which manages the mobile computing (laptop) portion of Intel's business, and the
Enterprise Platforms Group (EPG), which manages the enterprise server portion of the
business.
Planning
Planning is part of the Manufacturing organization TMG (Technology & Manufacturing
Group). PSPs (product supply planners) interface with MMBP and sales personnel to
manage last minute requests from geographic sales teams as well as dealing with planners
at ATM (Assembly and Test) sites when there are last minute product issues. Planning's
main function is to ensure that Intel's Fab and ATM sites are building enough product
and holding enough inventory to meet short-term customer demand.
Intel Supply Network Group (ISNG)
ISNG deals primarily with the logistics part of the business and ensures that there is a
cost-effective infrastructure for getting products to direct customers and to channel
customers on-time and as promised. ISNG is the closest Intel has to a pure "supply chain"
group but the group tends to focus mostly on logistics.
E-Business Group (EBG)
EBG is the most synonymous to the IT organization of most companies and its main
function is to understand Intel's business at a detailed level and lead projects that will
streamline Intel's processes and operations, especially from an IT perspective. Several of
EBG's current key initiatives relate to the supply chain: (1) Edge-2-Edge (E2E) -
improving the ability for planning and manufacturing to reset their production plans more
rapidly to adjust for market changes and customer needs. (2) Edge-2-Customer (E2C) -
improving the customer focus and responsiveness of Intel's entire supply chain. The
research being discussed in this thesis is very closely connected with both of the E2C and
E2E initiatives.
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Sales and Marketing Group (SMG)
Sales and Marketing is responsible for all direct interactions with Intel's customers and is
the group that manages all customer orders and deals with customer issues. CBAs
(customer business analysts) and GBAs (Geo business analysts) play a key part in
filtering hotlist requests before they are escalated up to Planning and MMBP. Members
of the Geo sales management team provide key input which is used by MMBP to
determine Judged Demand.
Worldwide Customer Satisfaction Team (WCST)
WCST's charter is to deliver value to customers through operational and supply chain
initiatives that lead to greater customer commitment and revenue while optimizing Intel
resources. Its focus has been cost effectively improving the customer experience. WCST
is typically engaged in any supply chain initiatives involving customers and provides
expertise into customer-facing processes.
IACPU Demand Forecasting Process
As mentioned above, MMBP is the organization responsible for the ultimate demand
forecast from marketing and sales (the "Judged Demand") that drives manufacturing and
production decisions and plans. When the Judged Demand (JD) forecast is refreshed
monthly, updated quarterly forecasts for the next 0-12 months are provided for each
microprocessor product at the SKU level.
Every month Intel's largest CPU customers are polled on how many CPU units they plan
to purchase in the next 12 months at the product family level. Next the sales teams in
each of Intel's four Geos make judgments on the demand forecasts from the customers,
adjusting for any double counting of market share wins across customers. Then each Geo
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Figure 3-1. Intel CPU's Judged Demand Process
The final Judged Demand is derived by MMBP through detailed analysis using the
forecasts from each Geo sales team along with many other relevant inputs including:
historical demand data, product and platform roadmaps, pricing strategy, PC BOM costs,
customer forecasts, backlog, market segmentation strategies, data on competitors,
economic indicators, PC consumption data, industry analyst forecasts, and the human
intuition of analysts on the demand forecasting team. (Figure 3-1)
For Intel's short-range CPU forecasts (0-12 months into the future), the demand
forecasting team does not currently employ any advanced statistical forecasting
techniques that are typically part of traditional inventory theory (e.g. Exponential
Smoothing, Winter's Model, etc.) Although MMBP uses a 3rd party demand planning
software solution to store and manage demand data, the software's statistical forecasting
functionality is not used as input in determining Judged Demand for the CPU business.
For long-range CPU forecasting (1-5 years into the future), MMBP leverages information
from Intel Corporate Market Research which does employ sophisticated statistical and








Forecasting demand for CPUs is extremely challenging given the dynamics of the PC
industry, short CPU product life cycles, sensitivity of the market to CPU price changes,
and many other factors. Despite these challenges, MMBP had an average forecast error of
only < 2% in 2003 in its quarter-level monthly forecasts for all CPUs. At the product
family level, forecast error was -5-10% in 2003. However, there does appear to be
significantly much more error and variability when Judged Demand is being determined
for products at more disaggregated levels like the sku level. This forecast error and
forecast error variability directly impacts how much safety stock inventory Intel needs to
hold to provide specific levels of service to customers, as discussed in a later chapter. It
might be valuable for MMBP to re-explore the possibility of using advanced statistical
forecasting techniques as another key input into determining Judged Demand (and not as
a replacement for the Judged Demand process), especially at product levels below the
product family level.
Build Plan Reset Process
Once planning receives the Judged Demand from MMBP, planning then takes this input
to define a production build plan for Fab and ATM. One of the challenges in the build
plan process (among many challenges) has been converting Judged Demand, which is
reported in quarterly time periods, into monthly and weekly build plan numbers for Fab
and ATM. Intel CPU demand is typically not linear throughout the quarter. Intel had been
using the heuristic of 30%-30%-40% to split Judged Demand into the 3 months of a
quarter since demand historically appears to be backloaded in every quarter. In late 2003
Judged Demand at the monthly granularity level was implemented to replace the need for
the 30%-30%-40% heuristic with the goal of providing more accurate monthly forecasts.
Once the monthly forecast is established, a weekly build plan is defined, assumably by
dividing the monthly forecast by 4.
Build plans historically had been reset about once a month but in late 2003 a mid-month
build plan adjustment process was also been implemented to enable Intel's CPU supply
33
chain to be more responsive to customer changes. This mid-month build plan update is
not a complete build plan reset yet because of the complexity involved in a full build plan
reset but is moving towards that.
The inventory models in this thesis assume that build plan reset and the lag time to get a
new request for die into the system and into the build plan still take about 4 weeks. As the
inventory models will show later, shortening this lag time or build plan reset time can
decrease WIP inventory requirements directly as well as reduce safety stock
requirements.
Microprocessor Manufacturing Process
From a general supply chain standpoint there are two major stages in the manufacturing
process of microprocessors (simplifying significantly since each one of these are
extremely complicated processes and involves hundreds of detailed steps):
(1) Semiconductor Fabrication (Fab)
(2) Assembly/Test (ATM)
The Fab stage is the process of converting raw silicon wafers to finished die.
The ATM stage is the process of assembling and packaging the die into its final
microprocessor finished product in either tray or box media.
Safety stock inventory is held at two main areas:
(1) Die safety stock (ADI - Assembly Die Inventory) is held at each ATM site and
new die units are shipped from Fab sites worldwide.
(2) Finished goods (FG) safety stock is held at components warehouses (CW) close to
the ATM sites and new FG units are provided by the ATM sites.
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Figure 3-2. Manufacturing process and lead times for microprocessor products in tray format.
For the sake of simplicity, inventory which is held at distribution hubs and at supplier
sites through channel JMI (joint managed inventory) is assumed to be a relatively small
amount and ignored.
Intel's Fab sites are in Oregon, Arizona, New Mexico, Massachusetts, California,
Colorado, Israel, and Ireland. Intel's ATM sites are in Malaysia, Philippines, Costa Rica,
and China.
ADI Replenishment Time
From a lead time standpoint, the Fab process itself takes about 8 weeks. It takes about I
week for die manufactured from the Fab process to be shipped to an ATM site. With the
current build plan reset process discussed previously, it takes about 4 weeks to get a
request for additional die into the Fab build plan. Thus, in general, the die replenishment
time is about 13 weeks (1 calendar quarter). Recently a partial mid-month build plan
update process has been piloted to allow new requests for die to get into the build plan on
a 2-week cycle instead of a 4-week cycle. However, the inventory models discussed in






It takes about 1.7 weeks to take die, assemble, and package it into a finished
microprocessor product state. Then it takes about 0.3 weeks to take the product from the
ATM site and move it into the components warehouse where the product is processed and
made available for shipment. With the current ATM process, it takes about I week to get
a request for additional units from ATM (assuming that there is die available). Thus, the
replenishment lead time for finished goods is 3 weeks for tray format (which is illustrated
in Figure 3-2). For finished goods which need to be packaged in boxes (box media) for
channel distribution, 2 additional weeks are required. Thus for box format, the
replenishment time is 5 weeks. However, since the bulk of Intel's sales are in tray format
sold to the global PC manufacturers, the research in this thesis will focus on the 3 week
replenishment time for tray finished good products.
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Chapter 4. Implementing Corporate Customer-Focused Supply Chain Metrics
"You can't get any better if you don't know where you are"'
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Chapter 4. Implementing Corporate Customer-Focused Supply Chain Metrics
One of the prerequisites for improving customer responsiveness is ensuring that proper
corporate-wide supply chain metrics are in place to measure and provide visibility to
those aspects of the supply chain that impact customer service the most. This chapter
will examine how Intel measures customer service today from a supply chain perspective,
provide a gap analysis for Intel's current approach, and provide recommendations for
implementing a comprehensive set of customer-focused supply chain metrics.
Measuring Customer Service Today
After interviews with 15+ people from Intel's MMBP, supply chain, and planning
groups, it appears that Intel today does not regularly measure and monitor a
comprehensive set of customer-focused metrics.
Intel's CPU business appears to track customer service in three ways:
1) Delivery fulfillment performance using RGID/EGID
2) Hotlist Request Fulfillment using % Hotlists Supported
3) CCP Product Request Fulfillment using % CCP units supported
Measuring Delivery Fulfillment Performance using RGID/EGID
The main metrics that Intel's CPU supply chain related groups appear to monitor
regularly are ones that relate only to internal delivery performance: % RGID late and %
EGID late.
"% RGID (Requested Goods Issue Date) late" measures the % of total shipments where
finished goods have left the warehouse later than the estimated date needed to give the
transportation provider enough time to meet the customer's requested delivery date.
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"% EGID (Earliest Goods Issue Date) late" measures the % of total shipments where
finished goods have left the warehouse later than the earliest possible date (e.g. the best
possible delivery date) that Intel could have achieved based on current conditions.
Figure 4-1 is a sample of the weekly % RGID late and % EGID late report.
Intel tracks these RGID/EGID-related indicators weekly and publishes them to a large
email distribution list that includes staff as well as executives within MMBP and
Planning. Since performance bonuses for planning and supply chain executives are tied to
this metric, executives are held accountable and incentivized to monitor how well Intel's
CPU supply chain has performed to these metrics.
.IJne ACT Delivery Performance (WW25)
" Direct VOC RGID meets the <10% goal. Currently at 6.7% (1.5% degradation from WW23).
* Direct VOC EGID meets the <5% goal. Currently at 1.8% (0.4% degradation from WW23).
RGID (% late)
Jun ACT May ACT Apr ACT
0.0% 11.5% 11.3%
Direct VOC 3.0% 4.6% 6.2%
ProductG 7.4% 4.3% 6.3%
Product2 0.0% 9.4% 12.5%
Product4 0.0% 15.6% 11.5%
Product5 0.0% 8.3% 18.8%
Product6 0.0% 3.4% 6.2%
Product7 0.0% 33.3% 16.7%
Product8 0.0% 4.9% 7.3%
Product1 0 0.0% 4.0% 3.4%
Product1 1 0.0% 4.0% 3.2%
Product Group3 0.0% 3.7% 3.7%
Figure 4-1. Sample of Intel's weekly % RGID
EGID (% late)


















and EGID late report.
It is difficult to review historical data trends since this data is stored on weekly
spreadsheets in a shared network directory and would require manual retrieval of
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Internal
information from all these spreadsheets.
Measuring Hotlist Request Fulfillment using % Hotlists Supported
The only other main metric that Intel appears to track regularly is % hotlist requests
supported. The Intel Planning and MMBP groups review this metric every week to gain
visibility on what % of total units requested by customers through hotlists that arrive
during the week are supported. Hotlist support is important since often these hotlists are
critical last-minute product requests from customers who have realized that their product
needs have changed in the near-term 0-13 week horizon. Since hotlist requests are
customer requests for product and how well Intel supports these hotlist requests impacts
how flexible and responsive Intel is as a supplier, hotlist support measurement is a
valuable area to measure.
Intel tracks % hotlists supported at an aggregate level for all CPUs as well as by product
family level through summaries in Excel which are sent to a distribution list each week.
% hotlist supported today includes both % of total units supported as requested (meeting
requested quantity and timing) AND % of total units supported with alternate linearity
(meeting requested quantity but not in the timing that the customer originally requested).
Today this metric is not tied to any specific performance bonuses but viewed as useful
data to drive future decisions. It is difficult to observe historical data trends since this data
is stored on weekly spreadsheets in a shared network directory and would require manual
retrieval of information from all these spreadsheets.
Measuring CCP Product Request Fulfillment using % CCP units supported
One other customer-focused metric that is measured today by Intel's MMBP group and
reviewed after the end of every quarter is % CCP units supported. This metric captures
the % of total units requested by customers during the regular CCP process that Intel is
able to fulfill. Since customer product requests for CPUs either come as CCP requests or
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hotlist requests, this metric is also important to measure.
Today this metric is not tied to any specific performance bonuses but viewed as useful
data point to drive future decisions.
Analysis of Current Metrics Today
Based on the supply chain metrics that Intel has in place today as described above, Intel's
current metrics relating to customer service appear incomplete and internally-focused.
First, the primary delivery performance metrics being used today (% RGID late, % EGID
late) focuses on internal performance. These metrics answer how well Intel is performing
in getting goods out the door in time to be delivered by logistics providers to customers,
but they do not provide any visibility into whether the customer actually received their
goods by their requested and promised dates. Intel might be able to meet its RGID date
for an order and get the goods out of the warehouse to give logistics adequate lead time,
but if logistics is late in its delivery, customers still regard Intel as being late despite Intel
meeting its internal RGID date. Thus, a low % RGID late or % EGID late performance
does not necessary lead to a high level of service to customers. To provide a true picture
of customer service, Intel needs to capture data on when customers actually receive their
goods and whether the quantity is what was requested.
Second, the metrics above do not provide a complete picture of customer service. There
is no visibility into how promptly Intel is able to respond to customer requests and there
is no complete picture of how well Intel is meeting customer requests. For example,
suppose Intel addresses the gaps in how it measures delivery performance and executes
well on accurate delivery performance metrics. Even if this may be the case, this does not
automatically imply that Intel is providing superior customer service. Does Intel take 5
minutes or 5 days to give an answer to a customer when a customer submits a request for
product? What percentage of units requested by customers is Intel able to meet in the
timeframe and quantities that customers want? A 95% delivery performance level when
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Intel isn't able to support over 50% of the units demanded by customers is still not very
good customer service.
Recognizing that improving customer service is a key priority for the company, Intel
executives formed a cross-functional corporate initiative called Edge-2-Customer (E2C)
that focused on improving all aspects of customer responsiveness at Intel. A subgroup of
that initiative, the E2C metrics team, was chartered to identify a comprehensive set of
customer-focused metrics to provide a more complete picture of customer service for
Intel's microprocessor supply chain. The author of this thesis was an active participant in
the E2C metrics team and the rest of the chapter describes many of the concepts and
frameworks that were introduced by the author and implemented as a part of the E2C
team.
Gap Analysis and Proposal for New Customer-focused Supply Chain Metrics
In identifying new proposed customer-focused supply chain metrics and filtering out
which ones would be most relevant, three frameworks were heavily drawn upon:
1) Customer Responsiveness Framework (as discussed in chapter 1) - This
framework was extremely helpful in dissecting a typical customer order
interaction into its important customer responsiveness dimensions of Promptness,
Availability, and Execution
2) SCOR Supply Chain Metrics Framework - The SCOR (Supply Chain Operations
Reference) Model was developed by a supply chain consortium called the Supply
Chain Council. It has been invaluable in providing specific "industry standard"
supply chain baseline metrics that supposedly have been adopted by 800+
companies across the globe.
3) AMR Supply Chain "Metrics Pyramid" Framework - A metrics framework
created by AMR Research was leveraged significantly to help prioritize and
organize the numerous metrics that were brainstormed as potential measures of
customer service in Intel's CPU supply chain.
43
Customer Responsiveness Framework
Using the Customer Responsiveness Framework that was developed for Intel and
discussed in chapter 1, the following aspects of the three customer responsiveness
dimensions were identified as potential candidates to be measured:
Dimension of What is Important Potential Way(s) to
Customer to Measure? Measure
Responsiveness
Promptness How quickly are we Total cycle time from a
typically able to customer submitting a
respond back to the request to receiving a
customer's request specific answer back.
with an answer?
Availability (of How often were we % of time periods/total
Product) able to meet the units/total line items
customers' needs in supported as requested
quantity and timing?
Execution How often do we % of time periods/total
meet our delivery units/total line
promises to the items/other that met
customer? promised delivery date
SCOR Metrics Framework
The SCOR Metrics Framework provided a comprehensive set of supply chain metrics
that encompass all areas within a company. These metrics were organized into 3 main
areas: (1) Customer facing, (2) Internal facing, and (3) Shareholder facing. Along with
this framework came working definitions, benchmarking sources, and suggested Level 2
and Level 3 metrics drill downs.
The customer facing metrics in the SCOR model were most directly related to the
research discussed in this thesis. Theses customer-focused metrics provided a key
"industry standard" baseline which the E2C metrics team referenced often in defining
Intel's new customer-focused supply chain metrics. The SCOR customer-focused metrics
are shown in Figure 4.2. The entire set of SCOR supply chain metrics can be found in
Appendix A.
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Figure 4-2. Customer-focused Metrics from SCOR Metrics Framework
AMR Supply Chain "Metrics Pyramid" Framework
As the E2C metrics team started to brainstorm different metrics relating to customer
service, the list of potential metrics grew quickly. One framework that was adopted to
help prioritize and organize the list of potential metrics was based on AMR's Supply
Chain Performance Measurement Framework.
In this framework (the "Metrics Pyramid"), metrics were prioritized according to whether











LI Strategic Metrics - executive
level indicators reflecting health/
performance of the company
across BVs & GEOs
L2 Tactical Metrics - division or
channel level indicators reflecting
health/performance of the BU/GEO
L3 Operational Metrics - sub-metrics
that provide necessary detail to
explain performance and drive
ooerational imDrovement
Number of Metrics
Source Based on AMR Research supply chain performance measurement framework
Figure 4-3. Metrics Pyramid Framework
Strategic metrics ("Level 1") - a very small number of metrics providing key information
for executives at a highly aggregated business level. For instance, strategic metrics could
be five metrics that a company's executive team members review to get a quick view of
the entire company's performance and health during a certain time period.
Tactical metrics ("Level 2") - a larger number of metrics providing key information at a
business division, channel, or geographic level. The intention is to provide more detailed
information behind the strategic metrics so one can "drill down" on the strategic metrics.
For instance, an executive may see that the strategic metric "delivery performance" was
69% for the entire company. Then the executive can drill down into the "tactical" level 2
metric to find out that Europe's delivery performance was 50% and pulling down the rest
of the geographies which have a delivery performance of around 90%. The management
of these geographic regions might just focus on the Tactical Level 2 metric for their own
region.
Operational metrics ("Level 3") - an even larger number of metrics providing key
information in one of two ways: (1) this information could be a further drill-down of
specific tactical metrics (e.g. which countries in Europe contributed most to the poor
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delivery performance) or (2) this information could be from other metrics which are
considered too detailed to be included as a strategic or tactical metric or which pertain to
only specific business divisions, channels, geographies, etc. Typically it is this level of
metrics that provides actionable data that can drive improvements in the business.
Operational metrics ("Level n") - metrics that provide deeper detail into Level 3
operational metrics. (These are not shown in the metrics pyramid.) The level of metrics
can go as deep as a company would like as long as these metrics are providing useful
detail into the metrics at the next level higher and as long as the number of metrics are
manageable and sustainable.
New Customer-Focused Supply Chain Metrics for Intel
Key Elements Intel Today Proposed Metric Measurement Challenges
of Customer Approach
Responsiveness
Promptness Not measured Booking cycle time Total cycle time - Difficult to
today formally (hours) from a customer collect data from a
submitting a request variety of









Availability (of - Partially Fill Rate (synonymous % of total units - Difficult to
Product) measured with "service level" supported as collect date from a
today using that will be discussed requested in variety of data
hotlist support in chapter 5) quantity and timing sources
% and CCP - Original
support % but (Level 2 metric customer
these are not would provide requested date and
metrics used additional data on quantity are not
outside of % total units stored in any
MMBP supported with system
alternate linearity)
Execution - Partially Delivery Performance % of line items - Original
measured to Requested Date where actual requested date not
using % RGID delivery date <= stored in some
late and % requested delivery systems
EGID late date and where - Actual delivery
- No visibility actual delivered qty date just started
to actual date requested qty being captured
customer - Difficult to
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Delivery Performance % of line items - Actual delivery
to Scheduled Date where actual date just started
(Level 2) delivery date <= being captured
scheduled delivery - Difficult to
date and where collect data on
actual delivered qty whether actual
= schedule qty delivered qty =
promised qty
Implementation of Customer-focused Metrics at Intel
In January 2004 the E2C team began the roll out of the new proposed metrics to the
entire Intel organization. The team created an internal website called the "Supply
Network Dashboard" on the corporate intranet that is accessible to anyone in the
organization who has security clearance to access Intel's intranet. The purpose of the
Supply Network Dashboard was to provide easily accessible and regularly updated
customer-focused metrics information in a highly visual and intuitive format.
When a person first comes to the Supply Network Dashboard, the initial view is the
Strategic Metrics ("Level 1 Metrics"). The metrics are categorized according to the key
performance attributes to be measured. The name of the metric is visible along with the
current time period's value, the trend (up, down, or same) compared to last time period,
the corporate goal for this metric, the frequency that the metric is updated, a link to a
graph that can show a visual of the metric or trends, a link to raw data where available,
and a detailed Word document with full detail on the metric and how it is measured.
All data in the screenshots below are fictitious and made up by the author.
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Supply Network Dashboard (Fictitious data)
129/2004
ttribute Levelto1 Turnsc valu Trn Goa Freeny Grp Data__ Definition
ReliabiliL Delier Performance to Rilustatie 92% 90% Weekly Perorm n
Fill Rate: Initial Response Alignment to 90925 QurelReuestet2.etr
Resonsiveness Bookin Ccle Time (hours 9 4 Quarterl
Cost iSupl Network Cost as a % of Revenue 3% 1.5% 1QuarterlyI
Asset Management
Efficienc Invenitory Tumns 20 25 Quarterly _
A person can then click on the name of any one of these metrics to see the tactical metric
detail ("Level 2"). Below is an illustration of the Level 2 for Delivery Performance to
Request Date metric.
SC:\intel I\metrics\sn dashboard for presentation\page Ia.htm - Microsoft Internet Explorer
File Edit, View Favorites Toos H* Bk 4wa + -ae1rc _F avorites Media
Address Ic C:\intel1\metrics\sn dashboard for presentation\pagela.htm
1/29/2004
(Fictitious data)
Delivery Performance to Request
IDate 92% t 90% 9 F
Geo AM 89% t 90% _ _ _
AP 83% t 90% _E
EU 75% _ 90% _B
JP 95% .90% 1 ___
Channel OEMs 93% 90% J
LOEMs 90% 4 90% _
Disti 87% 4 90% _B
Supergroup IAG 93% NIA _
ICG 90% NIA go
WCCG 85% NIA _
The Level 2 screen gives more specific detail on Delivery Performance to Request Date
by Geography ("Geo"), Customer Channel ("Channel"), and Business Division
("Supergroup").
As of late April 2004, the customer-focused metrics defined by the E2C team in the
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Supply Network Dashboard were awaiting ratification to become the new operational
metrics for Intel's Supply Network Group (ISNG).
Best Practices for Implementing Corporate-Wide Supply Chain Metrics
For supply chain metrics to be adopted successfully across an organization, there are
several key takeaways from the Intel case study that can be shared as best practices:
Do not proceed without high-level executive support
There must be at least one high-level executive champion (preferably at the management
team level) who cares about these corporate-wide metrics, regularly reviews these
metrics, and enforces accountability when performance is not satisfactory. This high-
level executive champion has the organizational power to drive alignment across
divisions and organizations so that everyone is focused on the same metrics and are
aligned in achieving the same goals. Without this high-level executive champion, the
corporate-wide metrics effort will not have the credibility and management enforcement
to make this a long-lived success.
Establish a cross-functional team
Because these metrics are far-reaching across different organizations and divisions
(especially at Intel), there must be a cross-functional team that has representation from all
the major constituents. Without this participation, there is likely to be resistance or
refusal to accept the new metrics from organizations or divisions which feel left out of
the decision-making process
Leverage a detailed template for clearly defining and communicating metrics
One of the challenges with metrics is that they are often communicated as a set of
numbers without much supporting information that clarifies exact definition, underlying
assumptions, method for calculation, and related issues. Without this information, the
credibility of metrics are often challenged and questioned. A metrics definition template




2. Definition of metric
3. Unit of measure
4. Specific formula/rules to determining this metric
5. How often measured
6. How often updated and published
7. Data source
8. Issues/Gaps in current metric
9. Granularity (what level of product/organization is this measuring)
10. Communication medium
11. Ties with performance bonuses
12. Owners: business, data, and technical
13. Sample display format/charts
14. Extent of historical data to be included
A metrics definition document was filled out for each metric and linked as a Word
document next to each metric on the Intel Supply Network Dashboard.
Bring all maJor stakeholders together to define metrics goals
Along with every metric, there should be a reasonable goal associated with it to
incentivize performance improvement. It is crucial to identify and bring all stakeholders
together to set goals for corporate-wide metrics, especially if the metric affects multiple
organizations and goals. Sometimes there will be conflicting interests that need to be
worked out across stakeholders to come up with a metrics goal that is most reasonable for
all parties involved. For instance, at Intel, fill rate is one metric that will require
significant discussion across multiple groups. Sales and WCST (the group that represents
the voice of the customer) might demand a high fill rate goal to increase sales and
customer satisfaction. However, this will mean higher levels of inventory. On the other
hand, manufacturing and supply chain groups might push for a lower fill rate goal to
minimize inventory and inventory costs. Discussions of tradeoffs will need to happen for
all these groups to come up with a mutual and reasonable goal for the fill rate metric.
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Tie metrics goals to performance bonuses where possible
Metrics and metrics goals by themselves may not be enough to incentivize employees to
improve company performance over time. Often employees may ignore metrics if they do
not impact them personally. One of the most effective ways to increase employee focus
on metrics is to tie achievement of metrics goals to performance bonuses. However,
companies must make sure that metrics goals and performance bonus incentives across
divisions are aligned with overall company objectives and not optimizing locally.
Employ a highly visual and interactive communication medium
For metrics to be widely adopted, it must be easy for users to understand and navigate
through the information being presented. Once the Intel E2C metrics team developed a
Supply Network Dashboard on an intranet site using a visual HTML format with links
that allowed for further information drilldown, users and management appeared to
embrace the concepts and information much more quickly than showing metrics and data
via Excel or Powerpoint (as was done originally).
Make metrics data accessible anytime from anywhere
Often the extra effort to find metrics data and access metrics data are so cumbersome that
users are discouraged from looking for such data. For metrics to be widely adopted and
leveraged, metrics must be easily accessible to those who wish to reference such data.
Implementing a metrics dashboard on an intranet site like Intel did allows for data to be
easily accessible and viewable anytime from anywhere. This makes it much easier than
combing through hundreds of Excel spreadsheets or Powerpoint slides. If security is an
issue, a username and password can be used to safeguard access to the intranet site.
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Chapter 5. Analysis of Intel's Current Strategy for Determining Inventory Targets
"When all else fails, use a heuristic""
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Chapter 5. Analysis of Intel's Current Strategy for Determining Inventory Targets
A key to being responsive to customers from a supply chain perspective is availability of
product, one of the key dimensions of the Customer Responsiveness Framework.
Availability of product refers to having the right amount of inventory of the right
products at the right time to meet the often variable demand of customers. This chapter
will examine how Intel sets inventory targets today and how its current approach affects
the level of service it provides to customers today.
Intel's Current Strategy for Determining CPU Inventory Targets
Instead of using traditional inventory theory to determine optimal inventory levels, Intel
uses a basic heuristic that drives its target inventory levels for CPUs. In general, Intel
uses the heuristic of 5 weeks of inventory (WOI) total in transit and in safety stock, of
which 2 weeks is die inventory (ADI) and 3 weeks is finished goods (FG) inventory.
For certain products for which Intel wants to provide higher levels of service to
customers (such as certain mobile and server products), Intel has defined the heuristic of
7 WOI total in transit and safety stock (4 WOI in ADI, 3 WOI in FG).
Discussions and interviews with numerous Intel personnel from different groups working
on supply chain related initiatives (MMBP, planning, EBG, etc.) confirm that many Intel
employees acknowledge this heuristic as what has been used to determine target CPU
inventory levels. However, no one interviewed was able to provide a detailed explanation
for how the current heuristic of 5 WOI inventory was derived. The best explanation
provided was "this is how we have done it for a long time and it's worked pretty well."
The 5 WOI heuristic is implemented by taking the latest demand forecast available
(assumed to be Judged Demand) and setting target inventory levels equivalent to 5 weeks
of the latest demand forecast. It is unclear how often the inventory targets are
recalculated and updated.
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Intel's Current Heuristic for CPU Inventory Targets
= 5 WOI = 5 * latest demand forecast (converted to weekly terms)
It is important to note that the 5 WOI does NOT equate to 5 WOI safety stock inventory.
As shown in the illustration below, the 5 WOI (2 WOI ADI and 3 WOI FG) include
inventory in transit.
Figure 5-1. Inventory Breakdown of Intel's CPU Manufacturing Process
True safety stock is that inventory that is physically located at the final inventory
destination and ready to be used. In-transit inventory that is being transported from Fabs
to the ATM sites do not count as safety stock nor does the in-transit inventory that is
being transported from ATM sites to component warehouses (CW). Since it takes about 1
week to transport inventory from Fabs to ATM and about 0.3 weeks to transport FG from
ATM to CW, Intel's heuristic translated for safety stock only is I WOI for ADI SS and
2.7 WOI FG SS = 3.7 WOI total safety stock. An assumption was made that Intel has
continuous production and delivery from its Fabs to ATMs and from its ATMs to CWs so




There are numerous advantages with Intel's approach of using a heuristic to determine
target inventory levels for CPUs:
The heuristic provides a straightforward rule of thumb that is easy to understand and
communicate globally.
With the number of CPU SKUs in the hundreds, products being launched and going EOL
regularly, multiple organizations involved in the planning of new production runs,
numerous fab and ATM sites manufacturing product across the globe, and product
demand often changing, Intel's CPU business is extremely complex. A simple heuristic
makes it easy to communicate the inventory strategy, reduces complexity, and minimizes
the possibility of making major mistakes.
The heuristic shields employees from a highly complex manufacturing process that is
extremely difficult to model quantitatively.
Intel's manufacturing process involves so much more complexity than the level of
complexity typically covered by academic inventory models. For example, there is
demand and supply variability in the Fab and ATM processes, lead times are variable, die
is fungible between different product families, bin splits across different CPU speeds are
not always controllable, and there many other complexities in the CPU manufacturing
process. Traditional inventory models are too simplistic and significant work and
resources would be needed to come up with a quantitative inventory model that
accurately reflects Intel's real-world scenario. If a simple heuristic can work relatively
well and can eliminate dealing with all the variables and complexity, a heuristic approach
would be preferred.
The heuristic is adaptable to the changing customer demand.
Because the heuristic incorporates weeks of inventory as a variable, the heuristic is not
static and can adapt as customer demand increases or decreases. This gives the heuristic
the ability to automatically adapt to new trends in customer demand.
The heuristic was develoDed based on exDerience and has been time-tested.
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Another advantage of the heuristic is that it seems to have worked "pretty well" over time
without significant crises arising out of the approach. Apparently enough slack has been
built into the heuristic that it has been able to address many of the complexities in the
CPU manufacturing process to date.
Disadvantages
Although there are many strong advantages for the use of Intel's heuristic to determine
target inventory levels for CPUs, closer examination of the heuristic brings forth some
significant disadvantages, some of which can lead to suboptimal business decisions and
inability to plan to specific service level targets.
The current heuristic does not take into account the correct factors to determine safety
stock, which can lead to misleading safety stock inventory recommendations.
The philosophy behind safety stock is to hold extra inventory to address fluctuations in
demand or supply. From an academic standpoint, safety stock levels are determined
quantitatively by a company's desired service level to customers, the level of variability
in demand and supply, and the lead time needed to replenish inventory. (Detailed
discussion of traditional inventory models can be found in chapter 6.) Intel's heuristic is
not based on any of these factors. It is purely based on average demand, which can lead
to levels of safety stock not correlated at all to any of the relevant factors.
The current heuristic may overcompensate when demand increases or decreases and lead
to too much or too little safety stock.
A positive feature of the current heuristic is that it is adaptive when demand increases or
decreases. However, a downside is that the heuristic may overcompensate when demand
does change. Since the heuristic is used today to determine safety stock, the heuristic
increases/decrease safety stock at a rate equal to the rate of change in demand. When
demand increases period over period, this does not necessarily mean that demand
variability also increases at the same rate if at all (and safety stock requirements
increase). Similarly demand decreasing over time does not necessarily mean demand
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variability decreases (and safety stock requirements decrease) at the same rate if at all.
Average demand can change independently from demand variability.
Example #1:
Suppose forecasted demand for finished CPU units (FG) is IM per week for a
given product in Q3 2004. According to the heuristic, you will need 2.7 x IM =
2.7M WOI safety stock for FG. Assume that this is the correct level of safety
stock in this situation.
Now suppose forecasted demand for finished CPU units for this product increased
to 1.5M per week in Q4 2004 but demand variability in absolute units remained
about the same. The heuristic would recommend 2.7x1.5M = 4.05M WOI safety
stock for FG. (For the purposes of this example, demand variability remains the
same. When demand increases, one would expect demand variability to increase,
but not as much proportionally as the increase in demand.)
If the heuristic were followed, an unnecessary additional 4.05M-2.7M=1.35M FG
safety stock units would have been held in inventory.
If a unit of FG cost $50/unit (fictitious cost), this would lead to 1.35M*$50 =
$67.5M more in unnecessary inventory.
Example #2:
Suppose forecasted demand for finished CPU units (FG) is IM per week for
another product in Q3 2004. According to the heuristic, you will need 2.7 x .M =
2.7M WOI safety stock for FG. Assume that this is the correct level of safety
stock in this situation.
Now suppose forecasted demand for finished CPU units for this product
decreased to 0.75M per week in Q4 2004 but demand variability in absolute units
remained about the same. The heuristic would recommend 2.7x0.75M = 2.03M
WOI safety stock for FG. (For the purposes of this example, demand variability
remains the same. When demand decreases, one would expect demand variability
to decrease, but not as much proportionally as the decrease in demand.)
If the heuristic were followed, there would have been 2.7M-2.03M=0.67M FG
safety stock units too few held in inventory and customer service levels might
unintentionally decrease because of it.
If the cost of a lost sale is $10/unit (fictitious cost), this would lead to 1.35M*$20
= $27M in cost of lost sales.
The current heuristic is biased towards higher safety stock levels for products with higher
average demand.
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With the current heuristic, products with higher demand forecasted will have higher
safety stock levels. In reality, a product with lower average demand and high demand
variability may need just as much safety stock as a product with higher average demand
but lower demand variability. In addition, stable products with high demand volumes
may require fewer units of safety stock than ramping products with lower average
demand.
The current heuristic does not enable Intel to plan to specific customer service levels
Using the current heuristic, Intel cannot directly set its inventory targets to meet specific
levels of service to its customers (as traditional inventory models allow). Instead,
customer service levels are potentially variable outcomes of the system as determined by
the heuristic and current variability in demand and supply and current lead times.
Because demand levels might change over time as well as demand variability and supply
variability, customers may experience inconsistent customer service levels from product
availability over time. This can definitely affect customer perceptions of responsiveness
of Intel's supply chain. With this heuristic, Intel does not drive customer service level.
Inventory strategy drives customer service level and Intel can only react to it.
Impact of Intel's Heuristic Approach to Customer Responsiveness
Although Intel's heuristic approach to determining CPU inventory levels has significant
merits for its simplicity in driving decisions for such a complex manufacturing process
and business, the heuristic approach may not be optimizing CPU safety stock levels for
high levels of product availability (and resulting customer responsiveness). The heuristic
approach also may lead to inconsistent levels of product availability and service level
over time. Finally, the current approach does not enable Intel to plan to specific customer
service levels explicitly.
The application of traditional inventory theory to determine inventory targets is explored
in the next chapter as an alternative to using this heuristic approach that may allow Intel
to improve responsiveness to its customers.
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Chapter 6. Applying Traditional Inventory Models to Determine Inventory Targets
"Can there be method to this madness?"
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Chapter 6. Applying Traditional Inventory Models to Determine Inventory Targets
This chapter examines improving customer responsiveness by continuing to focus on the
"availability" aspect of the Customer Responsiveness Framework. This involves applying
quantitative inventory models and the concept of "service level" to determine optimal
safety stock inventory levels which should better align Intel's inventory targets with
desired levels of customer service and product availability. Then the effectiveness of this
approach will then be compared with the heuristic approach as described in the previous
chapter.
Traditional Base Stock Inventory Model
One of the cornerstones of inventory theory is the base stock inventory model (as shown
below). This model is relevant for Intel's CPU manufacturing process (in contrast to the
continuous review model) since CPU inventory is reviewed periodically at regular
intervals and the appropriate quantity is ordered after each review.
BASE STOCK INVENTORY MODEL
Total inventory units
= WIP inventory + safety stock inventory
= mean demand * LT + z * std deviation of demand* sqrt (LT)
63
Input variable Description Example (fictitious data)
Mean demand The average demand (in units) Average demand of 30M
of a product for a specific time units of CPUs per week
period
Std deviation of demand The std deviation of the Std deviation of 6M units of
demand for a lead time CPUs per week
interval of 1 (i.e. how much
does the demand vary from the
mean over one lead time
period)
Replenishment lead time The replenishment time from Replenishment lead time of
(LT) the time a request for product 20 weeks
is submitted and the time the
product is received and
available. It is not just the time
to manufacture or assemble a
product.
Z The multiplying factor which 95% desired service level =
is determined by the desired Z-factor of 1.64. (Can be
service level derived using a normal
distribution table or using the
normsinv(.95) function in
Excel.). Here service level is
approximated to be the
probability of being able to
fulfill a request for one unit
of product during a LT cycle.
(In the base stock model discussed in this thesis, review period and cycle stock are not included
since continuous production is assumed for Intel's CPU manufacturing process.)
First, inventory models looking at only demand variability will be examined. Supply
variability will be discussed in an enhanced inventory model later in this chapter.
The base stock inventory model is typically used in two ways:
1. To determine how much inventory should be held given a mean demand, standard
deviation of demand, a replenishment lead time, and a target service level.
2. To determine what service level is being provided to customers given the current
inventory targets, mean demand, standard deviation of demand, and a
replenishment lead time.
Types of Inventory
It is important to distinguish between the different types of inventory in a given
manufacturing system.
Inventory Type Description Applied to Intel CPU business
WIP (Work-in- Inventory which is waiting in the The in-progress inventory
Progress) system for processing or is being inside the Fab and ATM
processed. processes. It includes the ADI
inventory in transit from the
Fabs to ATM sites as well as
the FG inventory in transit from
ATM sites to component
warehouses.
Safety Stock Inventory used to buffer against Intel has two CPU safety stock
fluctuations in demand or supply stages: ADI safety stock at each
during the replenishment lead ATM site and FG safety stock
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time. at each CW site.
Cycle Stock Inventory that is used to cover Because production of CPUs is
demand during the review period. assumed to be continuous,
It is consumed during the review review period and cycle stock
period and replenished at the end does not apply in the inventory
of the review period. On average, models discussed in this
the amount of cycle stock is '/2 the research.
amount of units during the review
period. This is more relevant for
batch production.
Application of the Base Stock Inventory Model
Before the base stock inventory model can be applied to determine Intel's optimal
inventory levels, several important questions must be answered first:
1. How should "service level" be defined for Intel's CPU business?
2. What demand signal is best to use?
3. What variability signal is best to use?
4. How should replenishment lead time be defined?
Defining "service level" for Intel's CPU business
One of the first challenges in applying traditional inventory models to Intel's CPU
business is coming up with a specific and clear definition for "service level" since this
term can be used to refer to many different aspects in customer service. Chapter 1 had
discussed the various dimensions of customer service.
The dimension of "service level" that is most relevant to inventory modeling is
availability of product (e.g. Did we have exactly what the customer wanted when the
customer wanted it?). How much product that is available in safety stock inventory
directly impacts a company's ability to fulfill customer demand (i.e. the service level).
From an academic standpoint, the level of safety stock will affect a company's
probability of meeting demand during the replenishment lead time. Figure 6-1 illustrates
this.
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Figure 6-1. Academic definition of "service level"
Applying Service Level Definition to Intel's CPU Business
The next step is to relate the ideas of product availability and service level to Intel's CPU
business. At Intel, customers place requests for product through the CCP or hotlist
process and these requests are supported (turning into purchase orders) or not supported
(sale is potentially lost). Each product request has a quantity (e.g. the number of units)
and desired timing (e.g. the desired delivery date).
Based on this reasoning, the definition for service level determined to be most
appropriate for Intel's current CPU business is:
Service level = % of demand requested by customers with requested date
and requested quantity satisfied
This definition of service level is what many companies equate to "fill rate" (e.g. percent
of demand that is filled). Fill rate is a concept that is often more familiar and specific to
supply chain and logistics professionals. We will use "fill rate" and "service level"
interchangeably from this point forward. "Fill rate" is also one of the customer-focused
supply chain metrics that have been implemented as a top level metric on Intel's Supply
Network Dashboard described in chapter 4.
It is important to note that in industries such as retail that sell directly to end consumers,
"fill rate" is defined as the amount of orders fulfilled from inventory within 24 hours.
(Examples may be Dell or Amazon.com.) This creates some potential confusion since
Intel's CPUs customers typically submit requests for product weeks (or months) in
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advance and do not expect 24 hour fulfillment from inventory (a last-minute hotlist may
be the exception). However, the spirit behind "fill rate" applies in both Intel's case and
the retail case is same: (a) there is some quantity of products demanded and (b) there is
some timing expectation for product. In the case of retail, the time expectation is 24 hours
and in Intel's case, the time expectation is weeks into the future. Thus, the concept of fill
rate still applies in Intel's case.
Once this base definition has been determined, the next step is to translate this service
level definition into concrete and measurable terms that relate and fit best with Intel's
CPU business. After research of literature, Internet and informal interviews with supply
chain professionals at other companies, service level typically is measured in the
following ways:
Methods to Places Advantages Disadvantages
Measuring importance on
Service Level
1. by total % of as many units of - incentivizes employees - may bias towards
units fulfilled* demand as to give priority to largest fulfilling large customers
possible are orders (and largest first and putting smaller
fulfilled customers) customers second
- potential for fulfilling
few very large volume
orders and ignoring many
small volume orders
2. by total % of as many order - theoretically gives all - missing an order line
order line items line items as line items (no matter item of lOOK units is no
fulfilled* possible are what size of customer) worse than missing an
fulfilled equal weight order line item of 10 units
- treats every line item - may incentive
and every customer as employees to fulfill
important smallest/easier orders
- data may be more easily first and put large
accessible since many orders/customers second
companies track delivery
by order line item
3. By total % of as many time - encourages 100% - if 100% demand
time periods periods as demand fulfillment every fulfillment is missed
where 100% of possible have time period within a time period,
demand was 100% fulfillment employees not
fulfilled* incentivized to care
whether it is 95% or 50%
fulfillment
*"fulfilled" here refers to fulfilling both quantity requested and date requested
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Each of these methods to measure service level has its merits and potential flaws. A
company should select the one method which will provide the richest information that
can drive action and can impact the bottom line the most. For Intel, market share and
volume are extremely significant so method I "by total % of units fulfilled" would be the
most appropriate. To Intel, missing 100 units or IOOK units is a huge difference, which is
why method 2 "by total % of order line items fulfilled" would not be ideal. For another
company where customer service is the main differentiator and it matters that every
order, whether large or small, is fulfilled with the same importance, method 2 may be
more appropriate. Method 3 is most appropriate in companies where tracking the total %
of all time periods in which there was 100% demand fulfillment is more important than
tracking units or order line items.
Thus, for Intel's CPU business:
Service level = % of all units requested by customers with requested date
and requested quantity satisfied
Determining the best mean demand signal to use
Another key input variable for the quantitative inventory models is mean demand. This
variable directly determines how much WIP and cycle stock inventory there will be in the
system. Mean demand does not impact the level of safety stock since safety stock is
affected only by service level, standard deviation of demand, and replenishment lead
time.
In the Intel CPU domain, there are a number of possible demand signals that can be used
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In Intel's CPU current inventory system design, there are 2 safety stock inventory stages
that would need to be modeled. Each of these 2 inventory stage needs to identify the best
average demand signal that would lead to the most accurate inventory recommendations.
Choosing the most relevant demand signal for die (ADI) inventory
Since the replenishment time for die is about 13 weeks, a quarterly demand signal would
be most appropriate. Judged Demand appears to be the demand signal that best fits this
description. One could take weekly backlog or billing demand and multiply it by 13
weeks and get an estimate of quarterly demand, but since backlog and billings are not
linear throughout a quarter, there would be some question of which week in a quarter to
use as the base weekly backlog or billing demand. Thus, Judged Demand appears to be
the most clear and relevant demand signal.
Choosing the most relevant demand signal for FG inventory
The replenishment time for FG is about 3 weeks so a weekly demand signal would be
most appropriate. Taking Judged Demand and dividing by 13 weeks may not generate the
most accurate weekly demand signal since weekly demand is not linear over a quarter.
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The demand signal that appears to have the least forecast error for estimating FG demand
within 13 weeks of delivery is backlog. Backlog is the number of units that customers
have booked via orders for a given week into the 0-13 week future horizon.
Determining the best variability signal to use
One of the other key inputs into the traditional inventory models is standard deviation of
demand, sometimes referred to as "variability of demand." The standard deviation of
demand reflects how much demand is expected to fluctuate around the average demand
during the replenishment lead time. Standard deviation is one of the main factors that
directly determine what safety stock requirements will be.
At first look, the standard deviation of demand may seem straightforward by calculating
the standard deviation of historic mean demand data (such as from Judged Demand).
However, in Intel CPU's business, this is much more complicated. Intel CPUs experience
short product life cycles (1-2 years on average and less than 1 year for some products)
and because of this, product demand over time is typically not constant because of rapid
product ramp ups and ramp downs. Calculating standard deviation of mean demand when
there are these short lifecycles would most likely lead to misleading results since
variability will be skewed much higher from the ramp up and ramp down effects.
Consequently inventory models would recommend much higher safety stock
requirements than actually necessary for a given service level.
In Intel's case, the best proxy for standard deviation of mean demand appears to be
standard deviation of forecast error, which is discussed in Levesques (2004), based on a
related supply chain research project conducted at Intel.
Std deviation of mean demand -
Std deviation of forecast error = Std deviation of (forecasted demand - actuals)
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Assuming demand forecast error is relatively stable and demand forecast processes have
not changed significantly (both of which appear to be true at the all CPU and product
family levels), the concept is that how much the demand forecast error varies over time is
a close reflection of the natural variability of customer mean demand. Of course, the
proxy is not perfect since demand forecast error could change due to a new forecasting
process or new personnel taking over the job, but using this proxy will produce less
misleading results than using the standard deviation of mean demand. More about this
concept can be found in Levesques' research.
The next consideration is how many data points constitute a valid standard deviation of
forecast error. With a short product lifecycle, many historical data points may be hard to
come by. It is suggested that for products with very few data points (suggested <5) that
the recommendations from the inventory models be scrutinized closely and sensitivity
analysis be performed to identify potential ranges of error.
One final important point is that the standard deviation of forecast error should be
updated regularly once new data is available to ensure that the models are incorporating
the latest data. Business processes or IT automation should be put in place to put up alerts
in case there is a significant change from existing values.
Determining replenishment lead time
"Lead time" is often an abused term that can refer to many different aspects of a supply
chain. There are manufacturing lead times, delivery lead times, and replenishment lead
times to name a few.
For traditional inventory models, the lead time that is needed as a key input is the
replenishment lead time. The replenishment lead time is how much time is needed to
submit a request for a new unit of product, receive it, and have it available and ready to
be shipped to a customer. (The definition of replenishment lead time in this model
includes the lead time for any time lag getting a request for product into the system.)
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Manufacturing lead time (or manufacturing throughput time (TPT)) is not sufficient. For
example, consider an ATM site that needs to hold die inventory. Manufacturing lead time
is 9 weeks and the time lag to get a new request into the system is 4 weeks (for a total of
13 week replenishment time). If the ATM site only stocks 9 weeks of inventory because
it only considered manufacturing lead time, then it would be short of inventory for the
remaining 4 weeks until supply is replenished. The ATM site needs to stock enough
inventory for the full replenishment time (as well as additional safety stock to buffer
against demand and supply variability during these extra weeks).
Lead time impacts WIP inventory directly as well as safety stock inventory to a lesser
extent. The longer the lead time, the more inventory there is in progress in the system.
The longer the lead time there is, the higher the safety stock requirements by a factor of
square root of the lead time according to the base stock formula.
Limitations of the Base Stock Inventory Model
Although the base stock inventory model is one of the most valuable cornerstones of
inventory theory, there are a number of critical limitations that need to be understood:
Assumption: Demand is relatively constant
As discussed previously, Intel's CPU product lifecycle is very short and demand typically
is not constant due to NPI and EOL effects. If a mean demand is taken from a NPI period,
then the inventory model may overstate recommended inventory levels. Furthermore,
because of the short life cycles, it is challenging to come up with a pure standard
deviation of mean demand. It is important to take inventory level recommendations for
ramping products or products going EOL with caution.
Assumption: Demand falls in a normal distribution
The assumption for this thesis and research is that demand for Intel's CPU products fall
in a normal data distribution over time-. In reality, this may not be completely true since
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customer demand is often influenced by Intel in terms of marketing promotions, pricing
strategies, competitor offerings, etc.
Assumption: Lead time is constant
In Intel's manufacturing process, there are hundreds of steps to convert a raw silicon
wafer into finished die. There is natural variability in lead time in Fab (as well as in
ATM) so this is not captured in the base stock model.
Assumption: There are no capacity constraints
Intel's business and flexibility to manufacture CPUs is highly dependent on Fab and
ATM capacity. New Fab capacity is extremely expensive and takes significant time to
build. The base stock inventory model does not incorporate any consideration for
capacity limitations.
Assumption: There is no supply variability
The base stock model also assumes no supply variability. In Intel's case, there is
significant supply and yield variability from Intel's complex Fab manufacturing
processes, introduction of new semiconductor manufacturing techniques, and new
products at the highest speeds.
Assumption: Single node inventory model
The base stock model only covers a single node inventory model. Even in the most
simplified state, Intel's CPU manufacturing process is a dual node inventory model with
die inventory held at ATM sites and FG inventory held at the components warehouse.
Assumption: Demand from one time period to the next period is independent.
The base stock model assumes that demand across time periods are independent. This
may not always hold true at Intel. For instance, if Intel is not able to meet some portion of
a customer's CPU demand for one period, this demand may roll over to the next time
period.
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Extending the Base Stock Model to Include Two Stages and Supply Variability
As noted above, there are many limitations of the base stock model that restrict its
effectiveness in modeling Intel's real manufacturing process. An ideal model would be
able to incorporate multiple inventory stages and address all the limitations above.
Research of operations management and inventory management textbooks did not
uncover any such multi-stage models that addressed the above issues.
However, in Levesques' LFM research at Intel, a two-stage inventory model was
developed by enhancing an existing model originally developed by Mark Graban (1999)
for the Eastman Kodak company. Levesques' model incorporates two stages (Fab and
ATM), allows for separate service levels for each stage, allows for supply variability,
allows for variable lead times, and provides inventory recommendations for ADI and FG
simultaneously.
The base stock model and a further enhanced version of Levesques' two-node inventory
model were used to generate the inventory findings and analysis discussed below. One
important limitation mentioned above but still not addressed by either inventory model is
the assumption that there is unlimited capacity.
One final significant assumption made with the two stage inventory analysis is that all
product families have the same supply variability and yields. In actuality, this is not true
since some newer products tend to have much higher supply variability and lower yields.
This assumption was made since supply variability and yield data were only available for
one of Intel's CPU product families. In addition, because this product family is one of
Intel's most stable and high-volume CPU product families, its supply variability is most
likely lower than that of other product families. As a result, recommended total safety
stock requirements across all products probably will be lower than what is needed in
actuality.
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Approach: Applying Inventory Models to Intel's CPU Business
Modeling Approach
Analysis of Intel's CPU inventory system using traditional inventory models was applied
in 5 steps to enable incremental learning and observations:
1) Single stage model - combining Fab and ATM as one stage
2) Single stage model - standalone Fab stage (ADI inventory only)
3) Single stage model - standalone ATM stage (FG inventory only)
4) Two stage model - Fab and ATM stages (no supply variability)
5) Two stage model - Fab and ATM stages with supply variability
Step 1: Analyze single stage model combining Fab and ATM
The purpose of looking at Intel's system as a single stage model first was to choose the
simplest scenario and get some ballpark results on what is the minimal level of inventory
that should be held in the entire system as well as how much safety stock might be
needed if the system were this simple. The Excel-based single stage model used for Steps
1-3 can be found in Appendix B.
Figure 6-2. Single stage inventory model for Intel.
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Step 2: Analyze standalone Fab stage (ADI inventory only)
The next step was to start breaking down the overall CPU manufacturing process into its
two main parts: Fab and ATM. (ATM will be discussed in step 3). The purpose of doing
this was to start heading towards a two-stage inventory system but to analyze what the
die inventory requirements of just the Fab process alone would be in a single stage
model.
This model assumes that raw silicon wafers (critical raw material for making die) are
100% available when needed. This assumption is not a bad one to make since raw wafers
are relatively inexpensive and not hard to procure. This also assumes that the substrates
needed in processing die are also available when needed.
Figure 6-3. Standalone ADI Inventory Model for Intel.
It is important to note that the step 2 model does not reflect that ADI target inventory
levels are impacted by the ATM part of the process. If the yields from the ATM process
are less than 100%, then ATM requires additional die units to cover for the yield loss.
ADI target levels = (I/ATM yield %)*# FG units needed
The yield consideration will be incorporated in the inventory models in steps 4 and 5.
77
Step 3: Analyze standalone ATM stage (FG inventory only)
The third step was to look at the ATM process as a standalone single stage process. The
purpose is to analyze what the FG inventory requirements of just the ATM process alone
would be.
This model assumes that the correct die to make the desired finished products in ATM is
100% available when needed. This is not always true in reality so the results most likely
will underestimate the actual inventory needed. The two-stage model in steps 4 and 5 will
incorporate this issue and include a die service level reflecting how well Fab meets
ATM's die needs.
Figure 6-4. Standalone FG Inventory Model for Intel.
Step 4: Two stage model without supply variability included
The next step was to model the system with two stages (Fab and ATM) and have one
model that provides optimal inventory recommendations for ADI and FG simultaneously.
As mentioned previously, the two stage model used in this analysis (see Appendix C) was
developed by Levesques, who enhanced an inventory model developed by Graban.
Levesques' model was extended with additional functionality to allow users to calculate
overall service level given safety stock WOI at the ADI and FG stages (see Appendix D).
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In addition, users can input different service levels for the ADI and FG stages and
calculate the overall service level.
Figure 6-5. Two-stage Integrated Inventory Model for Intel.
This model incorporates the dependencies between both Fab and ATM stages and defines
overall service level of the system to be the product of the individual service levels of the
ADI inventory and FG inventories. It is important to note that taking the product of the
individual service levels may underestimate the overall service level of the system. This
will be addressed later in this chapter.
In addition, no supply variability was assumed in this step. (Supply variability will be
incorporated in step 5 of the modeling approach.)
Step 5: Two stage model with supply variability included
The final step was to model the system with two stages and incorporate supply variability
to analyze how supply variability affects the overall inventory levels of ADI and FG.
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Product Granularity Considerations
One significant consideration in applying traditional inventory models is what level of
product granularity to perform the analysis. Depending on the level of product chosen for
analysis, this could lead to vastly different safety stock recommendations. Modeling
Intel's CPU products at a highly aggregated level could lead to pooling of demand
variability across products and overall reduction in demand variability. This would lead
to lower safety stock requirements than actually needed.
At Intel, CPU products are organized in this hierarchy (as it appears in Intel's demand
planning system):
All CPU Products
- Vertical (Desktop, Mobile, Server)
o Value Segment (Perf vs. Value)
* Brand (P3, P4, P4HT, etc.)
Family (Banias, Northwood, etc.)
o Cache (512K, etc.)
Speed
Package
o Front Side Bus
N SKU
Occasionally "Level 4" is used to describe a product level even lower than the SKU level
that includes product steppings (different manufacturing versions of the same SKU).
To compare the effects of variability pooling and to identify any significant differences in
inventory recommendations by product level, the 5-step inventory analysis was
conducted for Intel's CPU business at these product granularities:
- All CPU Products
- Desktop vs. Mobile vs. Server
- Performance vs. Value
- Product Family (Banias, Gallatin, Madison, Northwood, Prestonia, Tualatin, and
Willamette)
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- Desktop Performance vs. Desktop Value vs. Mobile Performance vs. Mobile
Value vs. Server
- Box vs. Tray
Data Used: Applying Inventory Models to Intel's CPU Business
Die inventory analysis:
Input Data Data Source Time Window of Data
Mean Demand Judged Demand (final JD Q3 2003
from Q3 2003)
Std Dev of Demand Std Dev of JD Forecast Error Q1 2002 - Q3 2003 (as much
(Historical Judged Demand 3 data that was available)
months out - Actual billings)
Lead Time Model steps 1-3 used lead Q3 2003
times learned anecdotally from
employee interviews. Model
steps 4-5 used lead time data
provided by Levesques.
Z (Service Level) Factor Generating inventory vs. N/A
service level curve for 75%-
99.9% in increments of 5%
FG inventory analysis:
Input Data Data Source Time Window of Data Used
Mean Demand Judged Demand from Q3 2003 Q3 2003
(divided by 13 to get average
weekly demand) (final JD
from Q3 2003)
Std Dev of Demand Std Dev of Backlog Forecast 2003 WWI 5 - 2003 WW39
Error (Backlog 3 weeks out -
Actuals)
Lead Time Model steps 1-3 used lead Q3 2003
times learned anecdotally from
employee interviews. Model
steps 4-5 used lead time data
provided by Levesques.
Z (Service Level) Factor Generating inventory vs. N/A
service level curve for 75%-
99.9% in increments of 5%
Analysis: Applying Inventory Models to Intel's CPU Business
Key Observations from Applying the 5-Step Inventory Analysis
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Some significant insights were drawn just from looking at a single product level (all Intel
CPUs aggregated together) and applying the 5-step inventory analysis. Below is a table
summarizing how total system inventory and safety stock are impacted by how Intel's
manufacturing system is modeled and by what data source is used to calculate demand
variability. An arbitrary service level of 90% was used for the inventory analysis.
ADI FG
Demand Demand Replen
Model Scenario: Demand Variability Variability Lead
(All IACPU aggregated, 9. svc level target) Data Data Data Time Total Total Total
(All inventory data in WOI) Source Source Source (wks) Total Inv Total WIP SS ADI SS FG SS
One-stage model for whole system JD JD JD 16 18.1 16.0 2.1
Die standalone JD JD N/A 13 1.6
FG standalone with no supply variability #1 JD N/A JD 3 0.9
FG standalone with no supply variability #2 JD N/A B&B 3 0.3
FG standalone with no supply variability #3 B&B N/A B&B 3 0.3
Two-Stage Model with no supply variability #1 JD JD JD 16 18.9 16.0 2.9 2.0 1.0
Two-Stage Model with no supply variability #2 JD B&B B&B 16 17.3 16.0 1.3 0.9 0.4
Two-Sae Model with no supply variability #3 JD JD B&B 16 18.4 16.0 2.4 2.0 0.4
Two-Stage Model with supply variability # - JD JD JD 15.8 21.0 15.8 5.3 2.5 2.8
Two-Stage Model with supply variability #2* JD B&B B&B 15.8 20.2 15.8 4.4 1.8 2.6
Two-Stage Model with supply variability #3' JD JD B&B 15.8 20.9 15.8 5.1 2.5 2.6
*Assumes all families and skus have same yields and supply variability
Figure 6-6. Results from inventory models applied to all CPU products aggregated
In applying the various models, different data sources were used to calculate demand
variability - some used "JD" variability of Judged Demand forecast error (JD minus
actuals) to be a proxy for demand variability for both ADI demand and FG demand, some
used "B&B" variability of backlog forecast error (backlog minus actual billings) to be a
proxy for demand variability for both ADI demand and FG demand, and some used a
combination of both. Using a combination of both seems be the most realistic model of
Intel's CPU operations since JD 13 weeks out is the main data input that drives how
much ADI is put into the build plan and backlog is the main data input that drives how
much FG is built.
From this table we can make some interesting observations:
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WIP inventory constitutes the bulk of total inventory in the system
The long overall replenishment lead times drive most of the total inventory in the system.
Replenishment lead time is generally 16 weeks from raw wafers through finished goods,
so there is about 16 WOI WIP in the system (assuming negligible cycle stock). Total
safety stock, in worst case, only amounts to an additional 5.3 WOI. Thus, if reducing
inventory is a priority, finding ways to reduce manufacturing lead times and/or lag time
to get a new request into the system would make the most significant impact on overall
inventory.
Converting from a one-stage model to two-stage increases SS requirements
The single stage model for the whole system provides one of the lowest total inventory
and total safety stock levels. The reason for this is that the Fab and ATM processes are
viewed as one continuous step with no die buffer in between and much of the variability
in demand for die and demand for FG are pooled together. This leads to lower safety
stock levels than two-stage models. This would be an expected result according to
traditional inventory theory.
As ADI and FG are decoupled from a one-stage model into a two-stage model, each stage
introduces its own demand variability into the system and requires safety stock at ADI
and FG. The overall safety stock needed in a two-stage model typically is greater than
that needed for a one-stage model even if all inventory model inputs are the same.
Without supply variability, ADI SS > FG SS as suspected
ADI replenishment time is 13 weeks whereas FG replenishment time is 3 weeks.
Mathematically safety stock is determined by:
z * std deviation of demand* sqrt (replenishment LT)
If we assume z and std deviation of demand are the same for ADI and FG, automatically
ADI SS (sqrt(13)) should be greater than FG SS (sqrt(3)) by sqrt(13)/sqrt(3) = 2.08 times.
The 3 two-stage scenarios with no supply variability confirmed this: ADI SS is greater
than FG SS in each case.
83
Supply variability significantly increases the total SS requirements
In the two-stage models without supply variability, total SS requirements ranged from
1.3-2.9 WOI. Once supply variability is introduced into the picture, total SS requirements
jump to 4.4-5.3 WOL Most dramatically, it appears that FG SS increases due to ATM
supply variability: from 0.4-1.0 WOI to 2.6-2.8 WOI.
The source of variability data (JD vs. backlog) makes a big difference in total SS
requirements
In general forecast error variability based on B&B (backlog) is less than forecast error
variability based on JD since backlog (typically tracked < 13 weeks out) is closer in time
to the date product is needed and tends be a better predictor of actual billings. Scenarios
where B&B is used for both ADI and FG demand variability are the typically the "best"
case scenarios resulting in the lowest safety stock requirements across the two-stage
models. Scenarios where JD is used for both ADI and FG variability are typically the
"worst" case scenarios with the highest safety stock requirements across the two-stage
models. The scenario where JD is used to compute ADI variability and B&B is used to
compute FG variability is in between these extreme scenarios and reflects Intel's business
most closely.
Comparison of Inventory Model Results with Intel's Current Inventory Strategy
As previously discussed in chapter 5, Intel's inventory strategy today is based primarily
on a heuristic of 5 WOI combined in transit and in safety stock. Broken down into the
two inventory stages, the heuristic is 2 WOI in ADI and 3 WOI in FG inventory.
Translated into safety stock terms, Intel's heuristic is I WOI ADI SS and 2.7 WOI FG
SS.
FG Safety Stock Levels > ADI Safety Stock Levels demystified
Early in the research the question arose as to why there is significantly more FG safety
stock (SS) than ADI SS in Intel's inventory heuristic since replenishment lead time for
ADI is 4 times as long as FG replenishment lead time. It was hypothesized that more ADI
84
SS should be held than FG SS and ADI SS should be increased and FG SS should be
decreased. This hypothesis was also supported by the fact that cost to hold an additional
unit of die is considerably lower than the cost to hold an additional unit of FG. (The
actual costs cannot be disclosed due to confidentiality reasons.) However, as was
discovered from the inventory models, more FG SS is needed than ADI SS because of the
supply variability in the ATM process. This explains why Intel's heuristic of I WOI for
ADI SS and 2.7 WOI for FG SS has 2.7x higher FG SS requirements than ADI
requirements.
Intel's heuristic today leads to approximately 83.7% service level today according to the
two-stage inventory model with supply variability
Reverse engineering Intel's current heuristic for 1 WOI for ADI SS and 2.7 WOI for FG
SS into the two-stage model with supply variability equates to a 74.3% ADI service level
and a 95.4% FG service level. Taking the product of these two service levels results in a
70.9% overall service level. However, it is important to note that 70.9% is the minimum
overall service level possible. When ADI is short in supply, FG is not always short at
exactly the same time. FG may have enough buffer to cover for the ADI shortage for
some percentage of cases. Assuming that FG has enough safety stock to cover for ADI




ADI SS ADI Svc FG Svc Service Level Service
Product Level WOI FG SS WOI Level Level (min)* Level
All IACPU 1 2.7 74.3% 95.4% 70.9% 83.7%
Overall Service Level (min) vs. Est. Effective Service Level
Overall minimum service level = 74.3%*95.4% = 70.9%
Estimated effective service level = 74.3%*95.4% + 0.5(100%-74.3%) = 83.7%.
If Intel wished to reach a 90% estimated effective service level, it would require 2.26
WOI ADI SS and 2.37 WOI FG SS (assuming equal ADI and FG service levels at 93%
each). Compared to these numbers, Intel's heuristic underestimates ADI SS by 1.26 WOI
and overestimates FG SS by 0.33 WOI for 90% service level. Intel could also reach 90%
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estimated effective service level through combinations of different ADI and FG service
levels as shown below. Intel might choose to reach 90% estimated effective service level
by striving for ADI fill rates higher than FG fill rates and vice versa.
Est Effective
Min Service Service ADI SS FG SS Total SS
ADI Fill Rate FG Fill Rate Level Level WOI WOl WOl
97.0% 91.2% 88.5% 90.0% 2.88 2.17 5.05
96.0% 91.7% 88.0% 90.0% 2.68 2.22 4.90
95.0% 92.1% 87.5% 90.0% 2.51 2.26 4.77
94.0% 92.6% 87.0% 90.0% 2.38 2.32 4.70
93.0% 93.0% 86.5% 90.0% 2.26 2.37 4.63
89.2% 94.9% 84.6% 90.0% 1.89 2.62 4.51
87.0% 96.0% 83.5% 90.0% 1.72 2.81 4.53
85.0% 97.0% 82.5% 90.0% 1.58 3.01 4.59
83.4% 98.0% 81.7% 90.0% 1.48 3.29 4.77
81.7% 99.0% 80.9% 90.0% 1.38 3.73 5.11
80.2% 99.9% 80.1% 90.0% 1.3 4.95 6.25
Figure 6-7. ADI fill rate and FG fill rate combinations to achieve 90% estimated effective
service level (These numbers were generated from the Custom Safety Stock Calculator #
3 in the spreadsheet model shown in Appendix D.)
In all the combinations above to achieve 90% estimated effective service level, Intel's
heuristic of I WOI ADI SS underestimates the amount of ADI safety stock recommended
by the inventory model.
An important point in the table above is not to focus on which combination of ADI fill
rate and FG fill rate that will result in the lowest Total SS WOI. The cost to manufacture
and hold one unit of ADI SS is much lower than the cost for one unit of FG. Thus, even if
a certain combination may lead to the lowest SS WOI overall, it may not necessarily be
the lowest cost option from an inventory cost standpoint.
One final caveat is that these numbers must be viewed with some scrutiny since the two-
stage inventory model is still a simplified approximation of Intel's inventory system and
does not take in account all the complexity in the real system. In addition, the above
numbers were based on models of all CPU products aggregated so there might be
significant pooling of variability and likely underestimation of safety stock needs.
Furthermore supply variability data was only available for one product family (the most
stable one) and applied to all CPU products. This would also tend to skew safety stock
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recommendations lower than needed. However, the models and the results do provide
some ballpark estimate of where Intel might be today in regards to service levels for its
CPU business.
Other Key Observations
In conducting the 5-step inventory analysis at the various product granularity levels, the
results confirmed that as one moves down the product hierarchy into additional product
granularity, demand variability does increase (due to increasing demand forecast error as
we try to generate forecasts at a more detailed product level). Figure 6-7 illustrates this.
Figure 6-7. Comparison of Inventory vs. Safety Stock curves by product level
The lowest curve on the graph (which represents the lowest inventory requirements) is
the curve for All IACPU, which aggregates all products as similar products and pools a
lot of the demand variability so overall variability is lower than actual. As one starts
segmenting Intel's CPU products and calculating the recommended safety stock levels,
the curves move upward. Not surprising, the curve for all product families is the highest
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curve since there are very different product families with varying levels of demand
variation.
Conclusions/Key Learnings: Applying Inventory Models to Intel's CPU Business
Application of inventory models with an iterative approach can lead to valuable insights.
Following the 5-step inventory model approach is not required. One could have just
jumped straight to the two-stage model with supply variability. However, starting with
simpler models and adding more variables and complexity at each step led to key insights
which may not have been gained otherwise.
What input data is used can significantly affect inventory recommendations.
As discussed, inventory recommendations from the models can very considerably
depending on whether demand variability was calculated from Judged Demand (JD) or
from backlog (B&B), This variability data highly affects overall safety stocks. If a
product is new and there are few historical data points, variability may appear higher than
it actually is and safety stock levels may be overinflated. The converse also holds true.
Variability might be lower than it actually is due to few data points and can lead to
underplanning of safety stock.
The level at which products are analyzed affects inventory recommendations.
The product granularity at which inventory modeling is conducted also affects inventory
recommendations significantly. In general, the higher the product level applied to the
inventory models for Intel's CPU business, the more pooling of variability and the lower
the safety stock requirements. In addition, the higher the product level analyzed, typically
the lower the demand forecast error and variability. This also leads to lower safety stock
requirements.
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Chapter 7. Applying Service Levels by Product Segment to Optimize Inventory Mix
"One size does not fit all - think segmentation""'
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Chapter 7. Applying Service Levels by Product Segment to Optimize Inventory Mix
This chapter continues the theme of increasing customer responsiveness of the supply
chain by improving availability of product through the use of quantitative inventory
models. By extending the application of these models one step further, a company like
Intel not only can optimize inventory levels but can also optimize its inventory mix to
better provide the right inventory of the right products at the right time.
One extension of the application of quantitative inventory models and service levels to
drive inventory targets is to set different service levels for different products or segments.
The previous chapter looked at applying inventory models and setting all products to
have the same service level for customers. In every company, including Intel, there might
be some products which require higher levels of service to meet customer needs (such as
newly launched CPUs in high demand). Or there may also products that are more
profitable or strategic to the company and which may merit a higher level of service than
others. Using one service level for all products could lead to having a lower than desired
service level for some products and higher than necessary service level for other
products. This translates into less safety stock than desired for some products and more
safety stock than needed for other products. Figure 7-1 illustrates this concept. Product A
has lower than desired service level while Products B, C, and D have a higher service
level than necessary. Because of the one-size-fits-all service level approach, Product A
will have fewer safety stock units than desired while Product B has slightly more safety











Figure 7-1. Single service level for all products - scenario I
Another common scenario is setting an extremely high service level for all products with
the service level matching the highest service level needed for any of the products (Figure
7-2). The service level is optimal for Product A but much higher service levels than









Figure 7-2. Single service level for all products - scenario 2
A seemingly more optimal approach is to set different service levels for different product
groups. Individual products with similar service level goals are grouped together and
share a common service level. This approach reduces the amount of excess service
provided and products can have safety stock levels much better aligned with the desired















Figure 7-3. Different service levels for different groups of products
Setting service levels by product or customer segments is a relatively straightforward
extension once a base inventory model has been established, as it already has been for
Intel's CPU business (chapter 6).
Setting service levels by product or customer segment
By leveraging traditional inventory models, not only can Intel take control of specifying a
service level across all products but Intel can also set different service levels by product
segment or customer segment. This will allow Intel to align its safety stock inventory for
different products more closely with desired business goals such as profitability, market
segment share, and strategic advantage.
There are numerous ways which
customer segments:
Intel's CPU products can be segmented by product or
Possible Segments Intel-specific Example
Product Vertical Desktop vs. Mobile vs. Server
Product Value Segment Performance vs. Value
Product Lifecycle Ramping vs. Stable vs. EOL
Customer Top 10 Customers vs. Non-top 10 Customers by
Revenue
Customer Channel OEM vs. Distribution
Product Media Box vs. Tray
Geographic Segment ASMO vs. APAC vs. EMEA vs. IJKK
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Product Cost Products with high production costs (manufacturing
costs or materials/inventory cost) vs. products with
low costs
Product Demand/Sales Products with high demand vs. products with low
Volume demand
Reliability of Demand Signal Demand signal with high confidence of accuracy vs.
low confidence of accuracy (chipset may have
reliability since customers are further down the
supply chain away from the customer)
Cost of Lost Sales Products with a high cost of a lost sale (e.g. strong
competition) vs. products with a low cost of a lost
sale
These segments can also be combined to provide a further level of granularity in setting
service levels.
Criteria for choosing a segmentation approach for service levels
With so many ways to segment Intel's CPU products, the next question to answer is
which approach is best for Intel's CPU products to be segmented so different service
levels can be assigned to each segment.
The following criteria were defined to select the best product segmentation approach:
1. Product segments should be easy and intuitive to understand.
2. Product segments should be aligned with how the business is run and how
decisions are typically made around the business.
3. Only the product segments with the most impact to the business (profitability,
market segment share, etc.) should be selected.
4. The granularity of product segments must be manageable and maintainable from a
manufacturing and inventory standpoint.
Recommended Service Level Segmentation Approach for Intel
Based on this criteria, the product segmentation approach that appeared to fit the best for
Intel's CPU business was a three-way breakdown of:
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[Product Vertical] plus [Product Value Segment] plus [Product Lifecycle]
Product Vertical is the term representing Intel's three main CPU product vertical
segments: desktop, mobile, and server.
Product Value Segment is the term representing an additional way how Intel segments its
CPU products by performance ("perf') (higher-end CPUs) or value (lower-end CPUs).
Product Lifecycle is the term representing what product lifecycle stage a product is in:
ramping, stable, or EOL (end-of-life).



















This particular segmentation approach was recommended for several reasons:
- This approach is closely aligned with how Intel's CPU business is run today and
is quite intuitive. Demand forecasting and pricing is closely based on a CPU
product's vertical and market segment, such as desktop performance vs. desktop
value.
- Product vertical and product value segment typically affect product profitability
as well as market share so both have high impact.
- Product lifecycle is a key driver as to how much inventory needs to be held.
- Three levels of granularity (leading to 15 different combinations which would
each need a separate service level target) seemed manageable and reasonable to
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maintain over time. Adding a more levels of granularity would make the approach
more unmanageable since Intel personnel would need to specify target service
levels for many more product segments each time period.
Other segmentation approaches considered:
[Product Vertical] plus [Product Value Segment] - This is a simpler version of the
segmentation approach recommended above and would require less effort to
maintain. However, it leaves out a vital piece of information (product lifecycle)
that Intel often uses to drive important inventory decisions. Thus, it was









One other variation that reflects Intel's CPU business well but could not be
explored within the limited timeframe of this research project was one that
separated the Mobile vertical into two separate verticals (Mobile - Mobility,
Mobile - Portability) and also distinguished servers as having product value
segments "MP" (multi-processor) and "DP" (dual-processor). This resulted in 24
unique combinations, which would require much more effort to maintain and
update without IT automation. It is recommended that this approach be explored
in the future by Intel.
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Applying service level by product segment at Intel
The following process was followed to implement service levels by product segment:
(1) Desired service levels were defined for each unique product segment.
Members of Intel's MMBP group were interviewed in November 2003 to provide their
recommendations on the desired service levels of the various product segments defined.
It was helpful to establish a level of abstraction to avoid arguments about specific
numeric service level values. The MMBP personnel were asked to recommend one of the
following abstract service levels for each segment: Very Low, Low, Medium, High, or
Very High.
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(2) Next a service level translation table was defined to translate the abstract service






This provided a baseline numeric service level for each of the product segments. In actual
application, service levels for individual product segments may have to be tweaked to
reflect tradeoffs in service level vs. inventory levels and inventory cost for each segment.
(3) Then existing unique product groups were mapped into the product segment
categories and matched with their corresponding baseline service levels.
98
Prod Prod Product Service,
Vertical Value Lifecycle- Level Goal
Segment











Value EOL Very Low
Server N/A Ramping Very High
N/A Stable High
N/A EOL Low
Intel Product Group 1 Mobile Pert Ramping Very High 95%
Intel Product Group 2 Server Stable High 90%
Intel Product Group 3 Server Stable High 90%
Intel Product Group 4 Des ktop Pert Stable High 90%
Intel Product Group 5 Desktop Perf Stable High 90%
Intel Product Group 6 Desktop Value Stable Medium 85%
Intel Product Group 7 Mobile Value Stable Medium 85%
Intel Product Group 8 Mobile Perf Ramping Very High 95%
Intel Product Group 9 Mobile Perf Stable High 90%
Intel Product Group 10 Server Stable High 90%
Intel Product Group 11 Desktop Value Stable Medium 85%
Intel Product Group 12 Mobile Perf EOL Low 80%
Intel Product Group 13 Mobile Value EOL Very Low 70%
Intel Product Group 14 Server EOL Low 80%
Intel Product Group 15 Desktop Value EOL Low 80%
Intel Product Group 16 Desktop Perf EOL Low 80%
(4) A quantitative inventory model was run for each one of the 16 product groups using
the target service level as a key input as well as demand data from Q3 2003.
Recommended target inventory levels for each product grouping were documented.
Comparison of Overall Inventory: One Service Level for All Products vs. Service
Levels by Product Segment
After applying inventory models to each of the 16 product segments, total overall safety
stock requirements were calculated by summing safety stock inventory needs for each
product group. An overall service level was calculated to be 88.5% by taking a weighted
average of each product group's service level and percent contribution to overall CPU
demand volume.
Then these results were compared against the total safety stock requirements from setting
a service level of 88.5% for all CPU products. The total overall inventory (in units)
remained about the same. The Service Level by Product Segment approach resulted in a
slight increase in units (+1%), but this appeared to be insignificant compared to total
number of CPU units. Some segments increased in safety stock from this approach and
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some decreased in safety stock from this approach, reflecting the profitability or strategic
importance of the various product segments.
Key Takeaway
Using this new approach of setting different service levels by product segment, Intel can
maintain about the same level of total inventory and maintain overall total service level,
but optimize inventory mix by aligning it better with Intel's desired business strategy.
There will be more inventory units (and increased service level) for the products which
are important to Intel's profitability and strategy and less units of products which have
lower profitability and more risk of becoming obsolete.
Other Considerations
Impact on inventory levels
Using this approach of service levels by segment, inventory levels may end up being
lower than the inventory level from having one service level for all products. However,
overall inventory units could also increase compared to total inventory units from having
one service level for all products. If maintaining the same level of inventory as the
original inventory level is crucial, then individual service levels for the various segments
can be adjusted so that the overall inventory level is about the same as before.
Impact on overall ASP of inventory
This approach will likely increase the overall average selling price (ASP) of Intel's CPU
inventory since Intel will hold more safety stock inventory of products which make Intel
high profits (like server CPUs) and less of the CPU units that only make marginal profits
like EOL desktop CPUs.
Impact on inventory valuation
From a financial standpoint, this approach has the risk of increasing valuation of
inventory, which may be a concern to the CFO and Intel's financial group. There may be
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fewer physical units of inventory but they may be of higher value so this might increase
inventory valuation.
Impact on inventory holding cost
If Intel uses this approach and holds more quantities of high value units (which cost more
to manufacture), this could also have an increase annual inventory holding cost. This may
also be a concern to the CFO.
Impact on customer service
This strategy could have a negative impact on perceived customer service. For customers
who buy a range of CPU products, Intel will appear to provide higher service levels for
some products and lower service level for other products. This inconsistency may not
build strong confidence in Intel from a customer standpoint. However this inventory
approach will help Intel achieve its strategic goals better. It is a tradeoff that Intel will
have to consider.
Implementation Pre-Requisites for Implementing Quantitative Inventory
Approaches
Overall it appears that using quantitative inventory models to drive inventory targets as
well as specifying different service levels by product segment can significantly increase
product availability and improve the customer responsiveness of Intel's supply chain.
However, before this approach can be implemented successfully, Intel would need to put
a number of key things in place first:
Analysis of the financial impact of the new inventory approach
A cost-benefit analysis was not able to be completed within the timeframe of the thesis
research project. The benefits of using a quantitative approach to drive inventory targets
and mix need to be quantified: Will additional revenue be generated due to better product
availability or better product mix? How much does Intel benefit in the short and long
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term from increased customer responsiveness? What is the cost of a lost sale? What is the
cost of a deferred sale? Is there a long-term cost for not building customer loyalty? Will
there be a labor savings? Although many of the benefits are difficult to quantify or are
intangible, it is important to try to define some assumptions that others may be able to
accept and quantify the benefits based on those assumptions. Then the benefits can be
weighed against the costs associated with this new approach: cost of additional inventory
(if necessary), cost of new IT systems, cost of training, cost of resources to implement
this project, etc.
Improvement of IT systems supporting historical demand and supply data
The traditional inventory models are only as good as the data which is inputted into them.
Much of the historical data needed as key input into the traditional inventory models are
stored on spreadsheets or not stored anywhere at all, with the exception of MMBP's
Microstrategy data warehouse which has historical JD and actual demand data.
Historical demand variability data is manually intensive to calculate and requires regular
updating as new data is available. Supply variability data is extremely difficult to access
in a consistent format from various fabs (since many of them use different systems) for
all product families. For the recommended inventory approach to be a maintainable long-
term solution, the relevant data and calculations must be automated in some IT system.
MMBP's Microstrategy data warehouse would be ideal for storing historical demand
variability data and would need to be made available for a wider audience.
Business Process Impact Analysis
An analysis would need to be done ahead of implementation to understand which
processes and people would be impacted by moving forward with the recommended
inventory approach. Future "to-be" process flows would need to be defined to ensure that




An analysis of the key stakeholders and the metrics on which they are measured to
achieve their bonuses is also critical. Some IMBOs and metrics may have to be
temporarily waived or readjusted to address potential effects of the implementation of the
inventory approach. Otherwise these stakeholders may not be supportive of the initiative.
For instance, employees on the financial side of the business may face the risk of
inventory value increasing and jeopardizing their performance metrics and bonuses. This
would invoke resistance from implementing the new inventory approaches although they
would be beneficial for the company. However, if the group's performance incentives are
altered and aligned with the new inventory approach, then there would be no issue.
Potential Implementation Challenges
Implementing the quantitative inventory model approaches discussed in this chapter and
in the last chapter are likely to encounter these challenges:
Company Inertia
Although increasing the customer responsiveness of Intel's CPU supply chain is critical
to Intel's long-term competitiveness, there is no current major crisis or problem that puts
this as a top priority in management mindshare. With the amount of effort and potential
disruption to the company, the initiative can easily be placed in the backburner by
management unless top Intel management makes this a key corporate initiative.
Getting agreement on target service level goals between sales/marketing and supply
chain/manufacturing.
Typically sales and marketing will push for the highest service levels to maximize
revenues and minimize potential loss of sales. Supply chain and manufacturing, the
groups which have visibility into the cost of producing and holding products, will
typically push for lower service levels to minimize inventory. The final agreement on
service level will most likely come from discussing the tradeoff between inventory cost
and cost of lost sales between the two sides.
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Getting agreement on target service level goals for different products within marketing
Even within marketing, disagreement may be encountered in setting different service
level goals for different products. It may be a challenge to explain to one product group
why their product will be given a lower service level than another product, especially if
product stakeholders have financial incentives to maximize sales of their respective
products.
Data/IT issues may delay this project for years
Currently there is no IT automation that would allow Intel to easily manage, track and
change service levels by product segment regularly and to keep variability data and
calculations updated. The process to collect data and build inventory models for different
product segments is very manually intensive today without much IT automation and
support. And there are no automated interfaces to take the inventory model
recommendations to feed into the Intel CPU build plan process. Furthermore, as we
increase the product granularity of our analysis, it becomes increasingly difficult to
manage and maintain without automation.
Intel may not have the available capacity to provide higher service levels
Even if we set higher service level targets for different product segments, Intel may not
have available Fab and ATM capacity to provide higher service levels with the current
level of demand. If Intel is forced to build new Fabs just to support this new inventory
approach, the costs of the new Fabs would definitely outweigh any savings or additional
revenue generated by our recommended inventory approach.
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Chapter 8. Other Approaches for Improving Customer Responsiveness
"Opportunity dances with those who are ready on the dance floor""vi
105
This page intentionally left blank.
106
Chapter 8. Other Approaches for Improving Customer Responsiveness
This chapter provides an overview of other potential supply chain approaches that might
improve the customer responsiveness of Intel's supply chain. Due to the limited
timeframe of the internship, there was not enough time to research these approaches in
detail. However, these approaches may lead to important future initiatives to improve the
customer responsiveness of Intel's supply chain.
Approach #1: Find New Ways to Reduce Overall Replenishment Lead Times
Today at Intel, overall CPU replenishment lead time from raw silicon wafer to finished
good is 16 weeks. This leads to a significant amount of WIP inventory in the system and
hinders Intel's flexibility to be responsive to changes in the business environment,
especially in the fast-moving world of high-tech electronics. If Intel can identify new
ways to shorten this replenishment time significantly, WIP inventory can be reduced (and
safety stock inventory to a lesser extent) and Intel can be more flexible in responding to
customer needs and changes to the business environment. In addition, reduction in
replenishment lead times will allow Intel and Intel's customers to forecast closer to the
actual date products are needed. This may lead to lower demand forecast error and
variability, which translate into lower safety stock requirements.
Intel's Fab TPT time for converting a raw silicon wafer into die is 9 weeks. In addition to
that, there is a lag time of about 4 weeks to get a new request for die into the build plan.
The total replenishment lead time for converting wafers to die is 13 weeks, which makes
up 77% of the total replenishment time for die->finished CPU unit.
Based on this analysis, one recommendation is to look for ways to significantly shorten
total ADI replenishment time in the Fab process. The lowest "hanging fruit" is shortening
the lag time for getting a new die request into the Fab build plan through streamlined
processes and use of IT automation to speed information flow. Today much of the
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process to get a new die request in the system is manual and most of the information
resides on individual Excel spreadsheets. The E2E initiative is closely looking into this
area and has piloted a process to shorten the lag time to 2 weeks through a mid-month
build plan reset process.
Another obvious recommendation which can reap huge benefit is to explore ways to
significantly shorten Fab TPT time which makes up 70% of the total replenishment time
in the Fab part of the manufacturing process. Because of the complexity involved in the
Fab process, this undertaking would require significant effort and resources but the
benefit is substantial from an inventory and competitive standpoint.
Similar approaches can also be applied to shorten overall FG replenishment time (3
weeks) in the ATM process. ATM TPT time for converting die into CPUs is 2.7 weeks.
In addition to that, there is a lag time of about 0.3 weeks to get a new request for a CPU
into the ATM plan. If FG replenishment time can be shortened enough, if high service
levels of die from Intel's Fabs can be maintained, and if there is enough ATM free
capacity, Intel could even consider a build-to-order model or at least start moving
towards a hybrid push-pull manufacturing system.
Approach #2: Enable a Postponement Strategy Using Single-Mark
To distinguish CPU products which are sold through distribution and which have a
warranty longer than those products sold directly to computer OEMs, Intel currently
imprints a unique mark on all those units designated for the distribution channel during
the ATM process. Although this approach helps Intel distinguish which units Intel is
obligated to provide extended warranty, this approach artificially segregates one safety
stock pool of the exact same product into two distinct pools of products which can no
longer be leveraged interchangeably. In situations where one of the pools of product is
short on supply, this inventory design restricts Intel's flexibility to pull inventory from
the other pool and prevents Intel from being more responsive to customer needs.
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Another side effect of this approach is that Intel now has to carry extra safety stock on the
same product since it can no longer have one general pool to cover unexpected product
demand in both the direct OEM and distribution channel. Furthermore, if forecast error is
significant (especially since forecasting demand from the channel is more difficult than
forecasting demand from OEMs), Intel might find itself in a situation where it has excess
CPU products that cannot be sold in the distribution channel while some OEM customers
are short of supply of the exact same product.
There has been internal discussion of a "single mark" strategy where the same product
would not be marked differently depending whether it is intended for OEM sales or
distribution sales. Instead, there will be a "single mark" on all products and the warranty
tracking would be done through IT systems instead of physically on the product itself.
This postponement approach would allow Intel to have more inventory flexibility and be
more responsive to meet customer product needs.
Approach #3: Re-engineer customer order processes for the CPU business
Because of Intel's CCP and hotlist processes, every product request from a customer
must be reviewed by at least one person at Intel and often escalated up and down a
review chain that may include the customer sales rep, the Geo sales manager, a product
planner, and a member of MMBP's supply team. Such human intervention is needed for
every CPU product regardless of whether supply is available or not. Not only does this
require costly human resources to process each request, it also prevents Intel from
responding to customers quickly.
Intel should look into different possible ways of re-engineering its customer order
processes for its CPU business. Might Intel be able to adopt a more typical available-to-
promise process for some products instead of an allocation-like process? Could a
workable hybrid between CCP and ATP exist?
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In addition, Intel could look into using IT to enable new ways of processing customer
product requests and orders. This might include enhancing external websites through
which customers can submit order requests and get self-serve tracking, introducing
automated workflow routing systems with smart rules that can automatically respond to a
customer's request if supply is available, and enhancing IT systems like OCOT or
building a new IT system that can enabled a seamless, paperless, and rapid flow between
the customer and all the internal Intel groups that need to review each product request.
Today the overall process is automated in some parts, very manual in other parts, and
lacks real-time visibility across the customer through all the internal Intel groups
involved.
Re-engineering the customer order process can potentially speed up the promptness of
Intel's responses to customers as well as improve customer demand visibility. Both of
these would lead to increasing customer responsiveness.
Approach #4: Communicate service levels for different product request windows
Another way to improve customer responsiveness is to provide more information to
customers up front and set their expectations accordingly. Today when Intel's CPU
customers want to change how much they originally ordered through the CCP process
and want to request additional units for the next 0-13 weeks, they must go through the
hotlist process. When customers submit hotlist requests today, the requests could be for
product to be delivered immediately or anytime over the next 13 weeks. Customers have
no idea whether or not a hotlist will be supported until they hear back from Intel.
To improve customer responsiveness, Intel could communicate some notion of service
level to its customers. For instance, Intel could let customers know that they should
expect a 90% service level for hotlist requests with a delivery lead time 3 weeks or
greater and a 25% service level for hotlist requests with a delivery lead time < 3 weeks.
Communicating this information sets service expectations and may influence customers
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to change their behavior and submit hotlist requests with more lead time. This may result
in fewer expedite requests in ATM and increase overall product availability.
Further research needs done to determine the specific expectations and service level that
would be optimal to communicate to customers.
Approach #5: Introduce new programs that incentivize more honest behavior from
customers
Today Intel's CPU customers have tremendous flexibility in their order terms and
conditions. In general it appears that most customers can cancel their orders anytime
within 1-2 weeks of their orders with no penalty and in some cases, especially with
Intel's largest customers, customers can cancel with no penalty anytime even up to the
point when orders are already in transit. Such terms are very generous from a customer
service standpoint and Intel sales personnel will most likely argue that this is needed to
be competitive. However, these terms and conditions have led to customer behavior that
actually hurts overall responsiveness to the entire customer base.
Because customers have generous cancellation terms, they often book orders on amounts
more than they usually need and then cancel at the last minute without penalty.
Customers leverage this to protect themselves against forecast error or unexpected last
minute demand at Intel's expense. Customers also leverage these generous terms to cover
themselves when a product is going EOL, which is very common and often with CPUs of
specific speeds and steps. In situations where a product is going EOL, customers tend to
double book to hedge their bets - they book orders on the new product but they also book
just as many on the old product in case the EOL transition to new product does not
materialize as quickly as planned. Customers hold both products as long as possible until
orders materialize and then cancel at the latest moment possible. This is also true of
hotlist grants where customers order and "load up" on product early in a quarter, request
push-outs through the quarter and then cancel their orders at the last minute possible.
I11
This hurts Intel in several major ways:
(1) The fictitious demand resulting from gaming the system artificially increases
demand for products. With Intel's limited (and expensive) Fab capacity, this
could be causing Intel to manufacture more units than necessary and to use up
valuable Fab capacity unnecessarily. This could also be delaying the
manufacturing of units which are needed by customers.
(2) This fictitious demand also increases inventory in the system. Because of the
customer cancellations at the last minute, Intel will tend to have more inventory
than needed in the system. WIP inventory is also inflated.
(3) Overall customer responsiveness may be hurt by this customer behavior.
Inventory which customers have booked but don't intend to bill is reserved for
these customers while other customers who have real demand may not be able to
get any supply at all.
There are two types of possible solutions to this problem: (1) reactive and (2) proactive.
Reactive solutions accept this customer behavior as a given and as unmodifiable. One
approach would be to try to beat customers at their own game and try to predict the
excess artificial demand (the "bubble") from customer gaming based on historical
information. Then based on Intel's estimate of the size of the "bubble," Intel may decide
to take a risk and overcommit an amount of CPUs to customers who have real demand.
However, this is a risky approach and the "bubble" is hard to predict since there are so
many variables that influence the ordering behavior of Intel's customers. This may be
viewed more as a "band-aid" solution than a solution that attacks the root cause of the
problem.
Proactive solutions view this customer behavior as the result of current customer
incentives. Proactive solutions would focus on initiating new programs and terms and




1) Enhancing ordering and cancellation processes and IT systems to allow Intel to
have visibility on the worst offenders who cancel orders the most. Today Intel's
internal systems do not appear sophisticated enough to aggregate and summarize
order cancellation information down to the customer level. With this information,
Intel will have more leverage and evidence to come down upon those customers
who are gaming the system the most.
2) Redefining new customer terms and conditions which are still attractive and very
competitive but do not allow customers to cancel orders without penalty the last
minute. This one is difficult because Intel has already allowed the privilege of
canceling last minute without penalty to customers. Revoking the privilege or
imposing stricter terms without offering something in return probably will enrage
customers. Ideally if Intel can get customers to agree to some type of cancellation
penalty and have this penalty enforced, this will change customer behavior.
However, Intel will need to offer something to customers in return.
3) A relatively new area of supply chain thinking around options contracts may also
be a possible proactive solution. The premise is that Intel may be able to offer
options (similar to options in the finance world) to customers who want to
purchase a guaranteed right to buy CPUs at a certain price and certain date. The
options would be priced differently based on lead time of request as well as
quantity to be purchased. This work would leverage some of the leading edge
supply chain thinking done by Schmidt (2003) and supply chain software
companies like Vivecon. Based on some initial analysis, this approach may not be
feasible due to Intel's frequent dynamics in product pricing and customer
discounts. Setting options prices for products which are often changing in price
will require additional management and maintenance. In addition, this could lead
to a new opportunity for gaming by Intel's customers. Because Intel CPUs are in
high demand globally and can be traded like commodities, implementing options
may bring about new secondary options markets that can lead to unintended
pricing consequences. However, it is a very intriguing area for further research.
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Chapter 9. Implementing Change at Intel
"To move an elephant, you start by finding its most ticklish spots...
but make sure you get out of its way so it doesn't fall on top of you."
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Chapter 9. Implementing Change at Intel
This chapter examines the larger organizational factors that will impact the overall
chances of success for both the metrics and inventory modeling approaches at Intel.
Implementing these approaches successfully goes way beyond tracking metrics,
implementing several frameworks, and plugging numbers into quantitative inventory
models. Implementing lasting change at huge corporation like Intel with 80,000
employees requires looking beyond a project's details and understanding the project's
alignment with Intel overall from a strategic, political, and cultural point of view.
Organizational Analysis of the Customer-focused Supply Metrics Initiative
In July 2003 the E2C metrics team started with strong momentum and backing from a
larger E2C corporate-wide initiative to improve and streamline customer-focused
processes across the company. The E2C initiative had decent executive level visibility
with regular reviews with high-level executives, which gave the E2C metrics team
reasonable executive mindshare. However, the entire E2C initiative encountered a major
setback in late 2003 when the initiative was indefinitely shelved due to apparent
budgetary constraints.
The E2C metrics initiative continued to live on, championed by a key member of the
WCST (Worldwide Customer Satisfaction Team). In January 2004 the team released a
pilot Supply Network Dashboard for which the team has worked to get buy-in and
support from multiple Intel organizations.
In analyzing the critical success factors for the future of this initiative, it is valuable to
examine the alignment of this project from strategic, political, and cultural perspectives.
Strategic Alignment
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From a strategic alignment standpoint, there had been some potential concern about lack
of executive support in improving customer service but this seems to have been
alleviated. The indefinite postponement of the E2C initiative in late 2003 appeared to be
a signal from Intel management that improving customer service was not a critical short-
term company imperative worth budgeting. However, the recent reorganization of many
of the groups involved with E2C into a new initiative, Tactical Demand Fulfillment,
appears reassuring. Backed by high-level executives in Intel's Technology Manufacturing
Group (TMG) and Sales and Marketing Group (SMG), this initiative has been chartered
to investigate ways to respond more quickly and positively to customer demand. The
metrics project is still being driven under WCST and does not have the same level of
cross-functional backing and management visibility as it did through the E2C effort, but
it seems to have made significant progress. The customer-focused metrics proposed by
the metrics team are awaiting ratification as ISNG's new operational metrics.
Political Alignment
From a political standpoint, WCST is an excellent organization to sponsor this project
since the project fits well within its charter to deliver value to customers through
operational and supply chain initiatives. However, it is not clear whether WCST has the
organizational influence and clout to achieve company-wide support and buy-in for the
customer-focused supply chain metrics. One of the critical keys to getting organizations
to adopt and track metrics is to tie performance bonuses to metrics. Because WCST may
not have the organization power to do this and to enforce accountability of such metrics,
WCST faces a huge challenge ahead. Furthermore, without executive level support,
middle management is likely to resist implementation of these metrics since it will force
them to do more work and use up valuable resources to track these metrics regularly
without clear payback for them.
Cultural Alignment
Intel has a very execution-focused and data-driven culture. Indicators and metrics are
commonly tracked in every organization in Intel. However, there is an overwhelming
amount of data everywhere and employees tend to focus only on those indicators and data
118
that tie directly to their work performance and performance bonuses. Without the
proposed customer-focused supply chain metrics tied to individual or group performance
incentives and in absence of a culture that places high emphasis on customer service, the
metrics initiative also has some significant cultural hurdles to overcome.
Critical Success Factors
Given the strategic, political, and cultural issues identified above, the following critical
success factors have been identified for the future success of the metrics initiative:
1. Find and engage a high-level executive champion.
The main priority for this team in moving forward is to find and engage a high-level
executive champion who has the ear of other company executives and who has the
organizational clout to establish accountability (see #2). Without this executive
champion, the project faces significant risks of not succeeding in the long-term.
2. Have the high-level champion establish regular accountability for the metrics.
New metrics will just be ignored or considered a "nice-to-know" unless management is
held accountable to these metrics regularly. Just assigning accountability and never
following up are not enough.
3. Involve other key stakeholders who would benefit most from the metrics.
One way of building momentum and support for the metrics initiative is to involve other
influential stakeholders from other organizations who can benefit positively from the
information from the new metrics. Once these stakeholders show their support for these
metrics, some momentum may be created to influence other parts of the organization to
come on board.
4. Work towards linking metrics performance to performance bonuses.
In additional to establishing regular accountability, tying metrics to group or individual
performance bonuses is one way to quickly align an organization around a set of metrics
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and keep employees focused on them. Otherwise, these metrics will be ignored or just
considered "nice to know."
Organizational Analysis of the Inventory Modeling/Service Level Initiative
The research conducted around using inventory models and service levels to determine
target inventory levels and inventory mix is closely linked to the E2E initiative, which is
attempting to streamline all of Intel's planning and inventory processes to enable a more
responsive and flexible organization.
The E2E project has been ongoing for several years and has significant support and
visibility from high-level company executives. The research work described in this thesis
as well as the research done by Levesques have provided key insights into Intel's
inventory system and have influenced future related research as a part of the E2E
initiative. Intel is currently exploring the use of inventory optimization tools such as
Optiant to automate much of the inventory analysis done in this thesis and in Levesques'
thesis and extend the analysis much further in more complex models.
Strategic Alignment
The E2E supply chain initiative is well aligned with executive management's desire to
create a more streamlined and efficient organization. Because of the size and impact of
this initiative, there has been significant management support and visibility. The E2E
team is composed of Intel employees from a variety of organizations so this has aided
cross-functional buy-in. One concern is that it is not clear whether company executives
truly appreciate and recognize the potential of leveraging the supply chain to drive new
sources of competitive advantage for Intel. There seems to be a perception that supply
chain is a merely necessary function to get products to customers as compared to design
and manufacturing, which are viewed as the company's esteemed areas of competitive
advantage. This general attitude toward supply chain could derail valuable initiatives like
E2E in the future.
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Political Alignment
The E2E initiative is driven by the E-Business Group (EBG) which is equivalent to the IT
organization of other companies. EBG's charter is to leverage IT to develop solutions that
add value to Intel's business. EBG's members are dispersed throughout many business
functions of Intel while maintaining a dotted line relationship to EBG. EBG is reasonably
well aligned politically to influence different parts of Intel and make significant business
impact through the E2E endeavors. However, EBG does face challenges from the
structure of Intel's organization. Intel's supply chain functions are decentralized across a
variety of organizations. There are often concurrent supply chain initiatives that overlap,
and there is no central supply chain group that sets supply chain strategy and coordinates
across projects. As a result, EBG must deal with this fragmented supply chain
environment to engage all the relevant parties and get their buy-in.
Cultural Alignment
Intel has an engineering-oriented culture. Along with this culture comes some natural
skepticism and cynicism. The E2E initiative through various incarnations has been going
on for several years now and was unsuccessful in some previous initiatives. Consequently
there is some skepticism and cynicism among employees who have been at Intel since the
beginning of E2E and who view the E2E initiative as a never-ending project of
questionable value. This skepticism may affect the momentum and rollout of any new
initiatives of the E2E team. The E2E team will need to win the skeptics over by showing
tangible results and improvement.
Critical Success Factors
Given the strategic, political, and cultural issues identified above, the following critical
success factors have been identified for the future success of the metrics initiative:
1. Focus on incremental short-term wins to gain the confidence of the organization
To dispel any skepticism or cynicism among management or employees towards the
value or effectiveness of the E2E initiative, it is important for the team to focus on
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incremental short-term wins to show the rest of Intel that the E2E project can result in
significant value to Intel.
2. Keep executive champions closely engaged
One of the strengths of the initiative is the current high-level executive support and
visibility for the E2E program. It is important to keep the E2E project highly visible and
to continue to engage current and new executive champions on a regular basis. Without
this support (especially as executives turn over or move within the company), the E2E
initiative is not likely to succeed.
3. Continue to foster cross-functional involvement and support
Because Intel is such a large organization and has decentralized supply chain functions,
the E2E team must continue to foster strong ties with key stakeholders from various parts
of the organization and involve them early in the process. This will be hugely beneficial
in getting cross-functional buy-in and may speed implementation of new initiatives.
4. Provide frequent communication and updates to the rest of the organization
One strategy for keeping employees engaged and interested in the E2E project is to
continue to provide frequent communication and updates about programs and results.
This is crucial for the overall change management process so there are no surprises across
the organization. This raises project awareness and often invokes useful feedback and
ideas from employees not on the project team.
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Chapter 10. Conclusions and Recommendations
"Only the paranoid survive."
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Chapter 10. Conclusions and Recommendations
For companies looking to improve customer service and customer responsiveness, often a
wealth of untapped opportunities lies within their supply chains. A company's supply
chain not only affects how promptly a company can respond back to customer requests
but it also affects how well a company can meet customer needs through product
availability. And the execution piece of the supply chain is what proves a company's
responsiveness to the customer by delivering to the company's promises.
In helping Intel's CPU business unlock new ways to improve the customer
responsiveness of its supply chain, this thesis examined two key approaches in depth:
(1) implementation of customer-focused supply chain metrics
(2) application of traditional inventory theory to drive optimal inventory targets and
inventory mix aligned with customer needs and company business strategy
These two approaches are fundamental to improving customer responsiveness. A
company cannot improve the customer responsiveness of its supply chain if it is not
capturing the right metrics and does not know how responsive its supply chain is in the
first place. A company's safety stock levels are crucial in determining how responsive it
can be to the product needs of customers and what service levels it can provide to
customers. Furthermore, segmenting products to allow for different service levels and
safety stock levels by product segment enables a company to better align its inventory
mix with customer needs as well as with company strategy. Using inventory models to
determine inventory targets is much more complicated and requires more support
infrastructure than using a simple heuristic. However, the potential benefit can be
significant from higher inventory turns, increased sales, increased customer loyalty,
improved utilization of fixed assets, and increased control over customer service levels.
With the customer-focused supply chain metrics effort, Intel has made important progress
towards being able to provide world-class customer service. These new metrics will drive
additional focus and visibility on many crucial but often overlooked aspects of Intel's
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supply chain which significantly impact customer responsiveness. Once there is greater
understanding and realization of how Intel is performing in these areas, this may uncover
other opportunities to improve customer responsiveness further. The metrics team needs
to continue evangelizing the importance of these metrics throughout the company and
continue to gain support and buy-in. Executive level backing is also critical to ensure that
various organizations across Intel are held accountable to these metrics in the future.
For a company to be responsive to customers, its supply chain design and processes must
also be aligned to support the desired levels of customer responsiveness. One significant
opportunity area for Intel to improve customer responsiveness through its supply chain
processes is in how it determines safety stock inventory levels. The application of
quantitative inventory models to set safety stock levels (as discussed in this thesis along
with the work done by Levesques) has tremendous potential to enable Intel to have much
more control over the levels of service it can provide to its CPU customers compared to
its heuristic approach today. In addition, these models can help Intel align its overall CPU
safety stock inventory mix much better with customer demand and company strategy.
Although the quantitative inventory models discussed in this paper and in Levesques
research rely on many assumptions and limited data, they provided key insights into how
Intel's safety stock inventory needs at ADI and FG are potentially affected by CPU
demand and supply variability, lead time, and desired level of customer service. These
models lay a rich foundation for further research at Intel and may lead to changes in
Intel's strategy for setting ADI and FG safety stock levels. Currently the E2E team is
exploring inventory optimization software solutions that would automate the types of
inventory models developed in this research and in Levesques' research. Furthermore,
these software solutions would be able to support much more complex and dynamic
models that reflect Intel's actual inventory system more closely. One important
prerequisite for the successful application of such models is accessibility of clean and
robust data. The recommendations from these models are only as good as the data that is
inputted into them. For the research discussed in this paper, it was a very time-intensive
and manual process to pull together the required data. If these quantitative inventory
modeling approaches are to be rolled out at Intel in the future, more automated means of
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pulling together the latest available data would be needed for long-term manageability of
these approaches.
Identifying supply chain metrics, defining frameworks, building spreadsheet models and
finding the right data to plug into these models are not trivial but is the easy part. The
much more difficult part is taking these approaches, which clearly can add tremendous
value for Intel, and successfully implementing them across an 80,000-employee global
organization that has a huge organizational structure but no centralized organization
coordinating supply chain strategy. This is where many of the strategic, political, and
cultural considerations discussed in chapter 9 come into play. Half the battle is coming up
with these new approaches to increase customer responsiveness; the other more difficult
half is getting many organizations within Intel to adopt them and use them successfully.
Other compelling areas for further research were also identified for Intel to potentially
improve customer responsiveness, as described in chapter 8. Some of these are internally
focused and lead to increased internal flexibility that may lead to improvements in
customer responsiveness. Examples of these are reducing product replenishment lead
times, single-mark postponement strategy, and re-engineering customer order processes.
Other ideas involve working with customers to proactively manage their expectations
better and to discourage gaming of supply. Research into any one of these given areas
could lead to significant improvement in customer responsiveness of Intel's supply chain.
In the first quotes mentioned in this thesis, supply chain is becoming "one of the business
battlegrounds for the foreseeable future." For companies like Dell, Wal-Mart, and
Amazon.com, the mentality of using supply chain as a competitive weapon has propelled
them to the top of their industry segments. As the supply chain is increasingly being
viewed by companies as a potentially rich source for strategic advantage, Intel
management should review how it leverages its supply chain holistically today and how it
may want to leverage supply chain differently in the future to extract competitive
advantage from it. Intel may want to consider establishing a central supply chain
organization in the future that sets a cohesive supply chain strategy for the company. A
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VP of Supply Chain position (as many other high-tech companies have) might be created
and would report into one of Intel's executives, such as the COO. This would give supply
chain initiatives high executive visibility and mindshare. In addition, this would allow
Intel to coordinate the many fragmented supply chain initiatives underway today and
manage its entire supply chain as one well-oiled system. The new organization would
also enable more rapid rollout of cross-functional supply chain initiatives. Accountability
for top level supply chain performance and metrics would roll up to the VP of Supply
Chain instead of being shared across organizations; this may reduce the tendency to put
the blame for poor supply chain performance on other organizations. These are just some
ideas how Intel might coordinate and leverage its supply chain into more of a competitive
weapon.
Many of the supply chain approaches and learnings discussed in this thesis are applicable
to other companies, not just to Intel. The application of-customer-focused supply chain
metrics can bring benefit to any organization which currently does not track how well it
serves its customers. Even for companies that have supply chain metrics established, the
metrics frameworks and metrics rollout approaches (such as the metrics dashboard) can
be leveraged to improve the effectiveness of existing company metrics. The approach,
findings, and insights of applying quantitative inventory models to Intel's CPU business
can also be leveraged by other companies who wish to implement quantitative inventory
models. Many of the issues around what data to use, service level definition, product
granularity, and model limitations are common across companies. Segmenting service
levels by product segment is an inventory strategy that companies using quantitative
models can utilize to drive better alignment of inventory mix, customer service goals, and
business strategy.
In the famous words of Intel chairman Andy Grove "only the paranoid survive." With
Intel as the world's top semiconductor company, every competitor is constantly looking
for opportunities to steal Intel's customers away. Intel should be very paranoid about
losing its customers, one of the company's most important assets. However, given Intel's
increasing focus toward developing world-class customer service and efforts to improve
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the customer responsiveness of its supply chain, this should lead to higher customer
satisfaction and stronger customer loyalty in the long-run. And hopefully Andy Grove
will be able to sleep a little better at night... for now.
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Appendix B. Single-stage Inventory Model
A B C D E F I G H
1 Single-stage Inventory Model for Product Family A (Q3 2003 Data)
2 Sample data
3 Lead time 1.23 quarter f
4 Mean I 4,761,498Iunits/guarter
5 Std Dev 1,961,149 units/quarter
Avg demand per
or replenishment (includes mfring TPT time + review period)
6 lead time 5,856,643
7
8
9 Expected Inventory level = WIP inventory+ safety stock inventory
10 Expected inventory level - Replenishment lead timemean demand + z*stddev(demand)*sqrt(replenishment lead timel)
11
weeks of
exp inventory safety stock quarters of weeks of safety
12 Fill rate z value level for lead time inventory inventory stock
13 75.0% 0.6745 7,323.693 1,467,051 1.54 20.00 7.00
14- 80.0% 0.842 7,688,009 1,831.366 1.61 20.99 7.99
15 85.0% 1.037 8,112,138 2,255,495 1.70 22.15 9.15
16 90.0% 1.28 8,640,667 2,784,025 1.81 23.59 10.59
17 95.0% 1.645 9,434,550 3,577,907 1.98 25.76 12.76
18 99.9% 3 12,381,701 6,525l58 2.60 33.80 20.80
19
20 z=number of std deviations of protection that the safety stock
21
22







































Bas Stc E F __MN___
(fictitious data), culDt
Total Inv E st Data
nv (Units)3 256 362 4,067,423 761 299 899,397 8,984,470 G #v s Calc'ed
Ln_____ 8.3 10.4 1.9 2.3 22.9 Color Results
SS (WI) 6.3 ' 1.3 7.6
A TM Supply Data (Weekly) A1 dInventory Data (Weekly) Demand Data (Weekly) A di
TPT (Weeks) Average p-..:L Pipeline Stock (VwP) 761,239 Demand (UntsAMk) Average p
Std. Dev / To Service Customer Orders Std. Dev ga
Cycle Stock (FGI) 392,422
Yield (DPU) Average 1 I "Safety Stock (FGI) 506,975 Review Period (Wks) Average Ai
Std, Dev o, " Good FG in CW 699397
Desired Service Level (Pct) Minimum CSL-A ?%
Avg(1 Yld) l, " / Avg cost1unit 4 10.00 Calc Z Factor Z
StDev(1 YId) Or Ai, 0 Total in Inventory $ 125.915.631
Neded for upstream demand variabiit
4ab Supply Data (Weekly) 4d Inentory Data (Weekly Demand Data (Weekly)
TPT (Weeks) Average
Std. Dev.
Yield (DPW) Average p,
Fab
Pipeline Stock (W"P) 3,256,352
Cycle Stock (die) 1,580,753
Safety Stock (die) 2,486,669
Die in ADI 4,067,423
Avg costlunit
Total $ in Inventory
Total Safety Stock
Total Work In Process
Total Cycle Stock
Demand (UntsAk) Average
To Service ATM Yield variabilitg Std. Dev
ADI demand variability only Std. Dev
Review Period (Wks) Average
Desired Service Level (Pct) Minimum
$ 11.50 i Calc Z Factor









"Estimated" Overall Service Level 81M%




S iT I U V W I X Y Z AA
inventory Non-VAP FG Weeks of Weeks of Mir Cost of Cost per yr
Fit rate z value level in CWV Safety stock inventory safety stock SS units ($K) ($K)
75.0% 06745 1,420,545 659,247 266,825 3.62 0.68 537,355 59,339
80.0% 0.8416 1,486,662 725,363 332,941 3.79 0.85 946.612 $11,653
85.0% 1.0364 1,J63,728 802,430 410,008 3.98 1.04 $57,401 $14,350
90.0% 1.2816 1,660,696 899,397 506,975 4.23 1.29 $70,977 $17,744
95.0% 1 .6449 1,804,416 1,043,118 650,696 4.60 1 66 591,097 522.774
99.9% 3 0903 2,376,209 1,614,910 1,222,488 6.06 312 $171,148 1$42,787
Custom FG Safety Slack Calculator:
Enter FG Fill Rate:) 156M, 00 ; 1,C1 1 ?%" % ; " L2.
Enter FG SSWOI: .' . f :03 | 23'.2 1 1421 12::' 1 N,
Fil rate z value
Exp Non-NAP Die Weeks of
inventory I in ADI I Safety stock I inventory
Week f Mfr Cost of Inv Holding




































1 7,576.949 I 5.996.196 27.51 15.28 5716.545 5179.136
1 ?S4kA16 I 4 1 , 2, !4 -44 1 i
Io"l Safety Stock Inventory versus Overall Service Level
n ,..nr: 'v..r.N3.,vq :)IN raN: .
________
ADI and FG Exp Non-WP Die Weeks of Weeks of Mfr Cost of Inv Holding
Overal Fill rate svc levels Inventory In ADI Safety stock Inventory safety stock SS units ($K) Cost per yr
70.0% 83.67% 8,281,982 4,264,332 2,291,156 21.10 5.84 $261,747 $70,437
75.0% 86.60% 8,578,589 4,560,939 2,587,763 21.86 6.69 5318,222 $79,555
80.0% 89.44% 8,911,752 4,894,101 2,920,926 22.71 7.44 5359,191 $89,79
85.0% .92.20% 9,304,M 5,286,354 3,313,179 23.71 844 $407,427 $101,857
90.0% 94.87% 9,803,611 5,785,961 3.812,786 24.98 9.72 $468.865 $117,216
96.0% 97.47% 10,556,462 6, 38,811 4,565636 26.90 11.63 $561,444 $140,361
96.0% 97.98% 10,778,478 6,760,828 4,787,652 27.47 1220 $588,746 $147,186
97.0% 98.49% 11,053,020 7,035,378 5,062,203 28.17 12.90 $622,508 5155,627
98.0% 98.99% 11,420,645 7,402,995 5,429,819 29.10 13.84 $667,714 $166,929
99.0% 99.50% 12,005,818 7,988,168 6,014,993 30.59 15.33 5739,674 $184,918
99.9% 99.96% 13,677,253 9,65903 7,686,428 34.85 19.9 5 8945,213 $236,303
Custom Total SafeLy Stok Calculator Il (assumes A01 and FG service levels ere equal):
Enter Overall Fill Rate: ; 6N .{ .271% 9T2 7 ,7,00 331 23 7 %
Enter Overall SS W _k _____ 7o4% 1, 30 ,j j-7 2 f24! 20 VI
Custom Total Sa Stock Caculator 82 does NOT assume ADI and FG service levels are equal):
ADI SS W
FO SS WOI $_
inventory Non-WIP Die Weeks of Weeks of Mfr Cost of Cost per yr
Fil rate z value level in ADI Safety stock Inventory safety stock ISS units ($K) ($K)
1:3 2012 i2 31 1 1 & I 724013 I C 749 I I I- i rln I w,214 I 1i 7f 1
,__,_ _ 2 2 67 1 1,441 563 1 41, 49,14 7 1 _ 1- 51 4 N I J%.
7.431,718 3141068 1,4 , 1 4 3la7 113,k04 148,4I
N7.8
18_11%
Custom Total Safet Stock Calculator 03 (does NOT assume AGl and FG service levels are equal);
Enter Fill Ras: ADI Fil Rate
FO Fi Rate
Fil rate
Inventory Non-NP Die ( Weeks of Weeks of IMfr Cost of Cost peryr
level I in ADI I Saf ty stock inventory saletv stock ISS units (SK)I (SK Iz value
1 2811,
9.0,0.714 5.0;14l 1 49 1 20 1 727 $343#4 93,11
AB I AC: AD AE AF AG AH Al
I __________ 111~~~ __________ I __________ 1*~i~I86,2% I. I I I
R
99.9% 3.0903 10,833,301
Custom ADI sart y Slock Caculator:
Enter ADI Fill Rate;[.7,0% . I I ,








75.0% 0.6745 6,145,856 2,889,504 1,308,751 15.66 3.34 $156,396 $39,099
80.0% 0.8416 6,470.151 3,213,799 1,633,046 16.49 4.16 $195,149 $48,787
85.0% 1.0364 6,848,157 3,591,805 2,011,052 17.45 5.12 $240,321 060,080
90.0% 1.2816 7,323,774 4,067,423 2,486,669 18.66 6.34 $297,157 $74,289
95.0% 1.6449 8,028,709 4,772,357 3,191,604 20.46 8.13 $381,397 $95,349
FG SaFel Stock Inventore vs. Service Level





75.0/ 00.0V 85.0/ 90.0% 95.00% 100.0v
Servie Level
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FG Resut LOverel Totals L
Service Level (mmn)
Service Level (st) L
A1. e u 7r Kei .k 11 -e -. I 1 9 l I , 4% , o I M. I , '55 M F 3455 n I OM
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